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FOREWORD

The face of M aine’s population is changing — and with those changes come new challenges
for M aine’s future. Recognizing how we are changing as a people can aid us in developing a vision
for M aine’s 21st Century which anticipates and responds to the shifting priorities, values and expec
tations of the Mainers of tomorrow.
Maine’s Changing Face is a study of the state’s changing demographics which are destined to
have significant impacts on the economy, resources and lifestyles of the future. The Commission on
M aine’s Future undertook this analysis to assist the state’s decision makers in understanding the need
for long-term policy initiatives to meet the demands of a changing population. To assist us in our study,
the Commission drew upon Census data, independent demographic analysis and original research.
Our study is not a forecast nor prediction of Maine’s future. It does, however, identify population
forces already in motion and emerging trends which could dramatically change the face of Mainers in
the future. The following is a brief summary of our major findings:
o

M aine’s population growth is slowing but the number of new
households is increasing twice as fast as the population, mostly
as a result of internal population, not inmigration of people
from outside Maine.

o

This trend — combined with a continuing migration (again mostly
internal) to traditionally rural Maine communities, rather than urban
centers — will place enormous pressures on housing, infrastructure
and environmental quality in the future.

o

Both of these phenomena suggest that Mainers must recognize their
own contribution to a deteriorating quality of life in our state rather
than narrowly focusing on the impacts of people “from away.”

M aine’s population is aging as fewer children are bom, as older
Mainers live healthier, extended lives and as the bulging baby boom
generation matures.
A shrinking proportion of young people will affect Maine’s expanding
economy by slowing growth in the labor force that will be needed
to sustain economic prosperity. Business’ response to this phenomenon
may include greater reliance on technology and recruitment of workers
from outside the state.
An aging population will affect the state’s “consumption profile” of
goods and services, shifting the emphasis from youth-oriented markets
to health care, affordable housing, mass transit and services for the elderly.
Nearly three-quarters of M aine’s households will have no children
by the year 2010 which will dramatically affect how future Mainers
invest their time, energy and money. Children could become the
major disadvantaged class of the 21st Century.
Baby boomers will be the predominant population force of the future
and will continue to place unprecedented demands on public and private
institutions and markets as they age.
More than a third of future Mainers will be “from away” and will
continue to have a major impact on the state’s economic, social and
cultural life.
Mainers of the early 21st Century will most likely have differing
value systems and priorities than their predecessors — less
traditional, more liberal on social issues and more likely to trust
government and to participate in it.
Maine will enjoy a 10 to 15 year period of relative calm, economic
prosperity and stability before M aine’s institutions and consumer
markets feel the full impact of the shifting needs and priorities of a
large-scale aging population — time in which to prepare for the crunch.

The following report details these findings and others as well as suggests possible future
scenarios resulting from the emerging and ongoing demographic forces that are already shaping the face
of Maine. The Commission on M aine’s Future hopes that this report will serve as a useful tool for
policymakers and for all Maine people who must think and act with foresight if we are to choose, rather
than inherit, Maine’s Future.

Annette Ross Anderson, Chair
Commission on M aine’s Future
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PART 1

TRENDS IN THE
MAINE POPULATION

I

SECTION 1

OVERVIEW

Maine has no greater resource than its people and no more
important force for change. This study looks at Maine’s changing
population in the closing years of the 20th Century and in the
opening years of the 21st. While these changes also hold implica
tions for life in the state after the year 2010, longer term issues are
beyond the scope of our study and will be noted only in passing.
Maine’s population history has been one of slow growth
and long term stability. Growth has been steady since the Great
Depression and in recent years there has been a slight acceleration
after 1970. Because of the long term stability of this history, recent

Figure 1

population growth has appeared rapid from an in-state perspective
but the pace of growth in Maine has been slower than the pace ex
perienced in the rest of the United States.

Maine’s population is not
growing as rapidly as the
populations of New England
and the U. S. but the pace has
picked up in recent years

Yet Maine has been closing the gap by which it has tradition
ally lagged far behind the nation and the New England region,
primarily because growth has slowed dramatically in some other
parts of the country. Since 1970, growth in Maine has outpaced the
rate of change in the urbanized states of southern New England and
has drawn to within a few percentage points of the national rate of
population growth. Looking ahead, population growth will con
tinue in Maine into the 21st Century, but at a slower rate than we
have experienced in the recent past.
M aine’s population is not only growing in numbers. It is
also changing in its demographic characteristics — the mix of age,
gender, social and economic backgrounds that both unite — and
separate — the people of the state. Demographic change has been
1

Source: U. S. Census

in evidence in the state since the close of the Second World War,
when an entire generation of returning veterans simultaneously
began to rebuild their civilian lives and form homes and families in
a tremendous burst of fertility that continues to resonate in Maine
life and culture after forty years. The changing characteristics of
Maine's Changing
Age Groups

Maine people resulting from this phenomenon will continue to
influence our social, cultural and economic lives for an even longer
period into the future.
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Population growth will continue to affect
Maine’s rural character as housing dev

Maine’s demographic structure
is undergoing a major change as
the populous baby boom gen
eration ages.

elopment, urban congestion and an evolving
pattern of suburban settlement reshape much
of the state.

Source: U. S. Census

o

Maine’s population is aging — a phenomenon
that will significantly affect every aspect of
Maine life, as well as shift our public, family
and economic priorities.

o

The growing influence of the “baby boom”
generation and of recent inmigrants to Maine
will strongly affect many of the social, political
and economic decisions that will shape our
state’s future in the 21st Century.

Understanding these trends can help us to better anticipate
the inevitable changes facing our state, to reduce the potential for
conflict and to create a common vision for M aine’s future which
best reflects the values, priorities and expectations o f the people of
Maine.
2

Population Dynamics and Underlying Trends
Population dynamics are where the past and the future
intersect. All population processes reduce to four very simple
events. People are bom. They mature. They move about geographi
cally. They die.

The Baby Boom
and Baby Bust

The events which shaped today’s population occurred in the
past — some in the quite distant past — while today’s events will,
in turn, shape events far into the future. Perhaps the most significant
example in the 1980s is the “ bulge” in the population due to a
disproportionate number of people between the ages of 27 and 44.
This mirrors the high birth rates of forty years ago following World
War II.
Birth rates remained high for seventeen years, from 1945 Figure 3
through 1962. Because the birth rates remained so high for so long,
The Baby Boom of 40 years ago

the generations which preceded and followed are much smaller. and the decline in birth rates of
Today the bulge occurs in the middle years of the population. We 25 years ago will continue to set
the pattern for demographic

can project this bulge will move upward in age as the people who change far into the future.
comprise it mature — a trend popularly referred to as the middle

Source: U. S. Census; Maine Office of
Vital Statistics

aging of America.
The generation bom during that seventeen years — the baby
boom — has placed extraordinary pressures, from cradle onward,
on public institutions and private markets alike. In the Fifties and
Sixties, the bulge in young and adolescent baby boomers placed
ever more pressure on schools and public education. In the Sixties
and Seventies, young adult baby boomers shifted the demand to
colleges and the job market. In the Seventies and Eighties, pressure
has shifted to the housing market. Beginning about the year 2010,
this disproportionately large generation will begin to reach retire
ment age.
Thus, a population event which took place twenty to forty
years ago will challenge society twenty years from now as it adjusts
to an exceptionally large retirement-age population. Ten to twenty
years after they retire, the baby boomers will trigger an even more
3

significant challenge as they begin to put pressure on the systems
that provide hospital and geriatric care.

Other Trends
The baby boom represents one of the fundamental trends

Housing and
Population

Persons
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Units
( 000)

underlying the population dynamics of the period surrounding the
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turn of the 21st Century. Five others are of equal significance.

600

o

A sharp drop in the birth rates during the Great
Depression and WWII creating a scarcity today
of persons between the ages of 45 to 55.

— Population

Housing

o

A sharp decline in fertility over the past twenty
five years resulting in fewer total births in the

Figure 4

total population, smaller families and a higher

Fewer people living in each
household have created a de
mand for housing that has been
growing twice as fast as the
population

proportion of households with no children at all.

Source: U. S. Census; Maine Dept, of
Economic & Community Development

erations immediately younger and older.

These two phenomena bracket the exceptionally
large baby boom with exceptionally small gen

o

The migration of persons from the urbanized core
to the fringe of metropolitan areas —both into
Maine and internally within the state —over the past
twenty years reversing an earlier pattern of eco
nomic and population decline in the fringe areas
through most of the 20th Century.

o

A sharp drop over the past twenty years in the
average size of households resulting in a growth
in the number of housing units twice as fast as
that of the population.
A sharp decline in the death rate of elderly per

o

sons over the past twenty five years has meant
more elderly surviving to very great ages.
4

None of these six underlying trends is unique to Maine. To
take the case of migration as an example, one county in Florida,
Palm Beach County, has experienced inmigration of 1,800 people
per day during the late 1980s and net migration of 900 people per
day. Daily inmigration to Maine, in contrast, has been less than 100
persons for the whole state and net daily migration has been under
10. Yet inmigration has become a major focus of public concern in
(000)

.
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growth management with an emotional charge that is surprising in
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comparison to the real size of the phenomenon. It may be, therefore,

1000

that these common national trends have worked themselves out in
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Maine in ways that are much more visible against the backdrop of
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able housing, land use, competition for jobs, property taxation and

the state’s small population base and traditional isolation.
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develop assumptions about the future. In some cases, these assump
tions would be difficult to challenge. The baby boom generation is Figure 5
unusually large. It will almost certainly continue to bulge its way Our assumptions about change in
through the age cohorts well into the next century. The Depression- Maine’s future are based on the
behavior of trends that extend

WWII generation and the generation born during the Vietnam War into our past.
are unusually small. They will almost certainly continue to have the
opposite effect on the age structure of the population.
In other cases, however, certain assumptions are open to
alternative interpretations. Assumptions about behavior are espe
cially problematic and four of the underlying demographic trends
describe patterns of behavior, although they are stable patterns that
have been in place for the past twenty to thirty years. These include:

The Fertility Rate. Will the fertility rate increase in the
future? Will women choose to have more children? The Census
Bureau projections used in this study assume a slight increase in
fertility through the coming decades.

The Rate of Net Migration. Will inmigration and outmi
gration continue in the future at the same rate as they have through
5

Source: U. S. Census

the past twenty five years? Will inmigration increase as America’s
cities become more crowded?

Will outmigration decrease as

Maine’s economy becomes more prosperous?

The base case

projections in this study assume that interstate migration of all kinds
will slow in the future as the nation’s population ages and becomes
more stable. But alternative scenarios are also considered, which
assume that inmigration will continue into Maine at the present rate
or will increase.

The Rate of Internal Migration. Will Maine residents
themselves continue to move from urban areas to suburbs and from
built-up centers to the open countryside at the same rate as they have
done in the past?

This study assumes they will and projects

population changes around the state in proportion to the patterns
established in the 1980s.

Figure 6

The Decline in Household Size.

Will the decline in

household size and the increase in the number of dwelling units
Uncertainty about how population
required to house the population continue into the future? Will the
forces will behave in the future
generates a range of possible
factors that influence household organization continue to fragment
growth scenarios.

the population into smaller and smaller units? This study assumes

Source: U. S. Census; Maine Fore
casting and Simulation Model

they will, but that the rate of fragmentation will slow from what it
has been in the recent past.
As a result of these assumptions, the projections that follow
are notforecasts but informed guesses. They are presented as such
to assist us in anticipating the potential for significant change and
impacts on Maine’s environment, economy and institutions.

6

SECTION 2

POPULATION GROWTH

In October 1988, the Census Bureau projected the Maine

The Maine Population:
Three Scenarios

population from 1990 through 2010. These projections, and the
(000)

Total Population

Census Bureau’s population estimates fo r 1986, are the sources o f
the demographic projections which follow.

Population growth will slow in Maine in the future but the
present pace of growth may continue into the middle or late 1990s.
Slower growth after the turn of the century will be endemic, not only
in Maine but throughout the U.S. By the year 2050, the Census

Census

Migration

Prosperity

Bureau projects a population decline for the first time in the nation's
history. For slow growth states like Maine, declining population

Figure 7

could begin a generation earlier than in the nation as a whole.
In the 18 years since 1970,158,000 people have been added
to the Maine population which now stands at 1,192,000. Growth
throughout the period occurred at the rate of nearly 8,800 people per
year or about five-sixths of one percent annually. In the 22 years
leading up to the year 2010, about the same number of people are
likely to be added to Maine's population but growth is likely to slow
to between 7,000 and 8,000 people per year —a rate of about twothirds o f one percent annually. Total population in 2010 is likely to
be around 1,350,000.
Two components drive changes in population

—

(1)

natural increase or the number of births minus the number of
deaths, and (2) net migration or the number of people moving into
the state minus the number of people moving out. Natural increase
is by far the dominant component in most places, including Maine,
7

Maine’s population will rise to
between 1.3 million and 1.4
million people by the year 2010,
depending on migration patterns
in the future. Three scenarios
outline the different possibilities,
each differing by about two
percent in total population after
20 years.
Source: U. S. Census

because the size of the population base far exceeds the number of
people moving into or out of the state.

Growth and Maine’s Population Base

Maine's Changing
Mortality Rate
(Deaths per thousand)

The age of the population helps to determine the rate of

12t

natural increase. Growth can be expected to slow when there are
large numbers of the very old in proportion to the total population,
because high death rates among the elderly offset growth arising
from births. Growth can be expected to accelerate when there are
9 -.

large numbers of young adults in proportion to the total population,
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because births most often occur in young families.

2010

Two other factors also influence the rate of natural increase
Figure 8

by moderating the number of births and deaths that occur in the

Maine’s elderly population has
been living longer, healthier lives
in recent years, helping to cut the
mortality rate by nearly one fifth
in 30 years. In the future, longev
ity will continue to rise but so will
the number of elderly people in
the state population. These two
trends will push the mortality rate
back up again, but not so high as
in the past.

different age sectors of the population.

Source: U. S. Census; Maine Office of
Vital Statistics

Longer life expectancy, brought on by medical and other
improvements, reduces the death rate expected in an elderly popu
lation of a given age. Fewer people will die in their seventies, for
example, and will live into their eighties. In any given year, there
will be relatively fewer deaths to subtract from total births, which
allows growth to rise through natural increase. The death rate per
thousand people has declined by nearly eighteen percent since 1960
and, despite the increasing proportion of elderly people in the
overall population in the coming twenty years, will remain nearly
twelve percent below the 1960 level in the year 2010.
The second moderating factor is the fertility rate, or how
many o f the young women in a given population choose to bear
children. In the 1970s, there were large numbers of young women
in the population, but many declined or limited childbearing. The
fertility rate was low and population growth through natural in
crease was much slower than it might have been. In the 1980s, even
fewer women are having children and it is this phenomenon which
will have the greatest impact on overall growth in M aine’s future.
8

The key factor behind the slower growth projected fo r
Maine in the 21st Century, therefore, is the continued decline in the
fertility rate that began in the early 1960s. In 1960, there were 36
infants for every thousand Maine adults. In 1986 there were 19. As
a result of the steep decline in fertility during the Sixties, Seventies
and Eighties, there will be 15 percent fewer young women in the
prime childbearing age group by the year 2010.
Although biologically capable of bearing children from
ages 15 through 44, most women in American society have their
children between the ages of 18 and 29. Three quarters of the births
in Maine from 1983 through 1986 were to mothers 18 to 29.
The small Vietnam War generation born between the midSixties and the mid-Seventies is now beginning to enter this prime
parenting age group and will continue to dominate birth rates in the
state through much of the next twenty years. The small size o f this
generation

assures that there will be relatively

few women

Figure 9

available to bear children through the period and therefore relatively
few children born. If these women, like their predecessors, also The fall in fertility rates nearly 30
years ago has reduced the

choose to have fewer children per family — in other words if the population of young women who
fertility rate continues to remain low — slow population growth might become mothers today.

This trend combines with the new

could only be overturned by radical changes in inmigration or in social standard of low fertility to
guarantee a sharp decline in the
longevity.
number of children born in the
future.

Other marked changes in the age structure of Maine society
will also occur by 2010. Much of the growth and change in M aine’s
population is occurring now. One third of all the growth that will
take place in the next two decades will occur by 1990 and one half
by 1995. The population under age 40 will decline by 78,000 per
sons; the population over age 40 will increase by 216,000 persons.
The proportion o f the population 40 and older will, as a conse
quence, increase from 38 percent o f the total in 1986 to 50 percent
in 2010. Almost half of the shift over age 40 as well will occur by
the end of the present decade.
Maine’s oldest citizens will also increase continuously in
numbers through the quarter century between 1986 and 2010.
9

Source: U. S. Census

Those age 80 and older will represent a larger share of the state
population in 2010 than they did in 1986 — their increasing
longevity a reflection of rapid and continuing improvements in
medical technology, but also reflecting the fruits of long term social
investments in nutrition, in public health and in old age assistance
The Components of
Population Growth
Census Scenario

through most of the 20th Century. But the population between the
ages of 70 to 79 will make up a smaller share of the state in 2010,
reflecting the small size of the Depression era generation, which
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will reach age 70 at the turn of the century.
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Migration has driven about one-third of the growth in Maine
over the past quarter century and is likely to become much more
important in the future as it begins to account for half and even more

Figure 10
Overall growth results from the
combination of migration and the
natural increase of the native
population. In the future, migra
tion will become the most impor
tant factor for sustaining growth
in Maine.
Source: U. S. Census

than half of the growth in the state’s population.
Three kinds of migration affect the rate of population
growth in Maine ------ inmigration or people moving in from out
of state, outmigration or Mainers moving out of the state, and net
migration, which represents the difference between the number of
people moving in and the number moving out.
Migration patterns have been quite stable in Maine on
average since the middle to late 1960s. Most of the variation — and
thus the factor controlling overall growth — has been in outmigra
tion. Most of the people who leave Maine are young and they have
tended to leave in the greatest numbers during times of poor
economic conditions in the state. Average outmigration through the
past quarter century has been about 35,000 people a year. That
number could rise to about 37,000 or 38,000 when times are hard or
it could fall to about 31,000 or 32,000 when the economy improves.
The pattern of inmigration is very similar to outmigration in
Maine, but there is less variation in the numbers from year to year.
Average inmigration through the past quarter century has also been
about 35,000 people a year, regardless of economic conditions. The
10

combined effect of stable inmigration and relatively stable outmi
gration has been a fairly constant population gain from net migra
tion of about 3,600 persons a year on average since the mid-1960s
and this stable pattern is continuing in the 1980s, when viewed
within the long term trend.
The Components of
Population Growth

Over shorter periods of time, migration patterns are likely to
fluctuate around the long term average. In the 1970s, for example,
net migration averaged about 4,000 persons per year before 1975

Inmigration Scenario
100000
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compared to about 3,100 persons per year after 1975. In the early
1980s, net migration fell to about 1,500 persons per year but rose to
about 6,000 per year after 1985. Preliminary figures for 1988 show
net inmigration soaring to nearly 13,000 in what appears to be a
short term aberation principally affecting York County.
In the late Seventies, net migration was below average be
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Figure 11

cause inmigration was only about 25,000 persons per year. In the
early Eighties it was low because large numbers of Mainers left the
state during the severe recession. In the late Eighties, high levels of
net inmigration reflect, in part, the influence of economic prosper
ity in keeping young Maine adults in the state, and in part, the effect
of unprecedented suburban growth in York County, as northern
Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire housing markets spill
across the state border. Yet over each of the decades, these short
term fluctuations averaged out. Net migration for the entire decade
of the 1970s was 35,400 or 3540 persons a year. So far during the
1980s, net migration is estimated at 32,650 for an average of 4080
persons a year.

Three Growth Scenarios
The Census Bureau projections cited at the start of this
section provide the baseline growth scenario for this study. The
Bureau projects an increase of 116,000 people in the Maine popu
lation by the year 2010, with a rate of growth about 5,300 persons
11

The stable migration patterns of
the past twenty five years are
projected out for the next twenty
to create the Inmigration Scenario
of growth slowing only slightly
from the present rate.
Source: U. S. Census; State Planning
Office

per year. Total population would rise to 1,308,000 at an annual rate
only half that of the past two decades.
This scenario rests on the assumption that the baby boom
generation will become more geographically stable as its members
The Components of
Population Growth
Prosperity Scenario
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pass age 40 between 1986 and 2002. Traditionally, residential and
geographic mobility tend to fall off sharply after age 40 as individu
als strengthen home, family, career and community bonds. Thus,
the Census Bureau projects net migration into the state to slow to
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about half the levels experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. As
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a result of this slowdown in inmigration, the Census Scenario
projects the lowest level of growth considered in this study — just
under 10 percent over more than two decades. Despite this slow
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down, however, inmigration will become the largest component of
growth in Maine in the opening years of the next century.

Figure 12
Under the Prosperity Scenario,
growth slows only after the turn
of the century as Maine’s expand
ing economy keeps young adults
in the state to meet the demand
for labor.

Our Inmigration Scenario projects additional growth by
assuming that migration patterns will continue to be stable in the
future. This scenario adds the long term average of 3600 inmigrants
to the Maine population each year to produce a total population of
1,346,000 in the year 2010 — 38,000 higher than the Census
Scenario total. Maine would add 154,000 persons by 2010 pushing

Source: U. S. Census; Maine
Foresacting and Simulation Model

the growth rate up to almost 13 percent, compared with the 15
percent growth experienced since 1970. The Inmigration Scenario
projects an intermediate level of growth, under which inmigration
would overtake natural increase as the largest component of growth
by the mid-1990s.
Despite the lessening of geographic mobility associated
with an aging population and the long term stability of migration
patterns in Maine (the assumptions that underlie our first two
scenarios) a third scenario, projecting increased migration, incor
porates the high net migration pattern of the late 1980s into its long
term assumptions. This high growth scenario is based on Maine’s
potential for job and economic growth, and the recognition that the
labor demand of Maine’s emerging economy would require a larger
population than the state, at long term levels of inmigration, could
supply. The Prosperity Scenario assumes a 40 percent increase in
12

the long term migration pattern to supply this needed labor. This
scenario generates a total population 1,369,000 in 2010, 61,000
higher than the baseline projections. Maine would gain an addi
tional 177,000 people and would grow at nearly the 15 percent rate
of the past eighteen years.
The difference between these scenarios is ultimately a
problem of timing the slowdown in Maine's population growth that
is made inevitable by the underlying changes in our demographic
structure. Under the Census Scenario, the slowdown would occur
in the early to middle 1990s — a prospect made unlikely by the
current level of net migration. Under the Inmigration Scenario, the
slowdown would occur around the year 1995 —earlier if there is a
severe recession in the early 1990s; later if York County housing
prices lag behind those of northern Massachusetts and southern
New Hampshire. Under the Prosperity Scenario, the slowdown
would be held off until the turn of the century. The longeviety of the
late 1980s pattern of net inmigration is the key to which of these
scenarios actually develops.

13
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SECTION 3

PATTERNS OF SETTLEMENT

Maine is the least-densely populated state east of the Missis
sippi and its settlement pattern is severely skewed to the southern

Population Densities
In New England

part of the state in general and to a transportation corridor extending
15 miles to either side of the Interstate 95 highway system. The
population is settled at the rate of 39 persons per square mile in the
state as a whole, 54 persons per square mile in the 1-95 Corridor and
209 persons per square mile in the three counties — York, Cumber
land and Sagadahoc — that make up Southern Maine.
Land use in the state reflects these densities. Only two
percent of Maine’s land area is developed in the sense of being
actually built upon, of being physically covered by houses, roads, Figure 13
stores, cities, parking lots. Only eleven percent is clear of forest Maine is sparsely populated by
cover. About half is “organized” into communities and the other regional and even national
standards, due to the huge size of

half (home to barely 12,000 people) constitutes Maine’s vast its forested resource base. But
unorganized territories whose forests physically dominate the north even in the settled parts of the

state, densities approximate only
the New England average in
pattern of settlement, then, is this split into communities and Southern Maine and the U.S.
average in the I-95 Corridor

ern and western parts of the state. M aine’s most fundamental

wildlands.

Source: Statistical Abstract o f The
United States

Households and Housing
The fundamental unit of settlement is the household —
often households of families, but also households of single indi
viduals and of unrelated groups. A sharp decline in household size
in the past two decades has been one of the most important
demographic trends taking place in Maine and in the nation. The
size of the average household in Maine dropped from 3.3 persons in
15

1960 to 2.6 persons in 1987. Further decline is projected by the
Census Bureau to 2.55 persons by 1990 and 2.26 by 2010.
As households grow smaller, more houses are needed to
provide shelter for a constant level of population. W hen population
grows as households shrink in size, the demand for housing is
pushed upward by both forces. In 1960, it required 300 dwelling
units to house one thousand persons in Maine. By 1980, it required
380 units to house the same one thousand persons; by 1990, it will
take nearly 400.
The rapid decline in household size results primarily from
three factors — growth in the elderly population, growth in the rate
of divorce and family break-up, and growth in the number of young
people living alone.
Figure 14

M aine’s elderly population is up by more than two-fifths
since 1960 and the single elderly population is up by one-fifth.

Smaller households combine with
the larger population to increase These changes mean that there are more one and two person
the pressure of growth on land
households in the general population.
use, traffic and the environment.
Source: U.S. Census

M aine’s divorce rate doubled between 1960 and 1986 and
the number of divorces in the state nearly tripled. One marriage in
two in the 1980s ends in divorce and one family in 50 breaks up
every year. When such a breakup occurs, it requires two dwelling
units to house the same number of persons who occupied one unit
before. By 1970, the number of divorces roughly matched inmigra
tion in Maine: by 1980, the divorce numbers were more than double
net migration numbers, implying the potential for four times the
impact in housing markets.
Between 1960 and 1980, M aine’s household population
increased by one sixth but the number of hou seholds nearly doubled.
A similar pattern has continued in the 1980s. Between 1980 and
1987, the household population grew by 5.5 percent while the
number of households grew twice as fa st at more than 11 percent.
As a result, even though annual population growth has averaged
only about five-sixths of one percent for nearly three decades, the
16

impact of this steady growth on the demand for housing has been
radically higher.
At the same time that Maine households have been growing
smaller, the baby boom has been moving through its prime house
hold formation years — the ages between 18 and 44. This age group

Household and
Population Growth

increased by 53 percent — from 320,000 to 490,000 population —
between 1960 and 1987, while the number of housing units in
creased by 57 percent, from 304,000 to 477,000 units. Little of the
growth in Maine households is due to inmigration from out o f state.
Over 90 percent o f the increase is solely the result o f the internal
population dynamics o f shrinking household size and large num
bers o f baby boomers in the housing market.

Population

As a result of these combined forces,

— Households

the number of

permanent, year-around dwelling units has increased in Maine at an
average rate of more than two percent per year for the past 27 years.

Figure 15

An estimated 173,000 new units have been added to the state’s
housing stock for an increase in household population of 212,000 The number of households in

Maine is growing faster than the

persons — meaning that four new units were built fo r every five number of people living in house
additional people. The shrinking American household, then, has holds, as the number of elderly
people and of divorces increases.

lent powerful impetus to Maine’s housing boom. Yet despite
radical differences in housing markets, subsidization and specula
tive building through the past three decades, M aine’s housing
economy demonstrates a structural pattern of long term stability,
reflected in a consistent eight percent rate of “overbuilding” or
vacancies in new housing units. These vacancies reflect a constant
level of market friction stemming from the normal movements of
housing consumers as they relocate from home to home or town to
town.
Despite the internal source of Maine’srapid housing growth,
many consequences remain for land use and prices, for environ
mental impacts and for traffic. When the decline in household size
is coupled with the internal migration of Maine residents from one
town to another, the pattern of rapid development and suburbaniza
tion that has so alarmed many observers in recent years becomes
evident.
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Office of
Vital Statistics

Between 1980 and 1986, there was a net flow of 26,000
Maine residents from one town to another— generally from larger
to smaller places. This flow around the state of Maine residents —
internal migration — was two and one quarter times the net
migration of out of staters into Maine. More than two-thirds o f the
Baby Boomers in
The Housing Market

total migration into Maine towns consists o f Maine residents
moving around. At the same time, increasing numbers o f families
with two earners in the workforce has meant greater reliance on
commuting and increasing traffic on rural and suburban roads.
The combined influence on Maine municipalities of the
trends toward declining household size and internal migration
within the state has added 50,000 dwelling units statewide between
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1980 and 1987 — with nearly two in five of those units added in

1987

towns of between 2,500 and 10,000 residents. One third of the
housing growth has occurred in cities of greater than 10,000
Figure 16

population and just under one third has occurred in M aine’s smallest
villages. In the future, the pace of development is likely to slow by

The concentration of baby boom
ers in the age of young adulthood
during the recent past accounts
for much of the pressure on
Maine housing markets —
similar to the pressure they
placed on local school systems in
the 1950s and 1960s.

about a third, from near two percent annual growth to near one
percent annual growth through the coming twenty years and the
location of new construction is likely to be fairly evenly distributed
through municipalities of different size

The effective impact of

housing development in the future is likely to be most evident, as it
has been in the past, in M aine’s suburban communities, particularly

Source: U.S. Census; State Planning
Office

those within the 1-95 transportation corridor.
The regional impact of new housing development should
continue to be heavily concentrated in southern counties, which are
likely to absorb nearly half of the new housing units through 2010.
Another third of new construction in likely to be concentrated in
central and eastern regions near the 1-95 corridor, but with one new
unit in five in these regions located in coastal Hancock, Lincoln and
Knox counties. By 2010, an estimated 130,000 new units will be
built statewide at the rate o f about 5,600 per year. Comparable
figures for the period 1960 to 1980 were 173,000 new units added
at about 6,400 per year. More than 50,000 of those new units are
likely to be built in Maine’s mid-size and suburban communities,
about 45,000 in the cities and about 30,000 in the rural villages.
18

Housing prices, however, more than suburban growth pres
sure or traffic, have been the bellweather of intensive housing
development in Maine. An analysis of new housing starts and
aggregate residential investment in Maine reveals that, between
1970 and 1988, the price of an average new dwelling unit in Maine
more than doubled, from $33,900 to $69,700. Yet virtually all of

Housing Growth
in the 1980s

this run-up — nearly 93 percent — occurred between 1970 and
1980, long before a crisis in affordable housing was apparent to the
average Maine resident.
The unprecedented demand for housing created by the baby
boom and the decline in household size represents only one dimen
sion of the acceleration of prices that occurred during the 1970s. At
the same time, consumer tastes and public regulatory and incentive
programs lead to considerable improvement in housing quality in

— Housing Units

Households

Maine. In 1950, for example, half o f Maine homes lacked complete
plumbing facilities, while fewer than one in ten had more than one

Figure 17

bathroom. By 1970, nearly one in six homes remained unplumbed
and another one in six had more than a single bathroom. By 1980, New housing development

slowed in Maine during the

only about one home in twenty lacked plumbing, while one in five recession of the early 1980s and
had multiple bathrooms. Part of the increase in housing costs in the accelerated again with returning

prosperity. But the construction

1970s, then, resulted from a shift in the housing stock to deliver trend closely follows underlying
growth in the number of house
more house for the money.

holds, despite the short term
influence of economic conditions.

During the 1980s, the unit price of new housing in Maine
has been virtually static, up only about seven percent, despite the
well-publicized and unprecedented increases in the prices of homes
at the top of the market into the six and even seven figure range. The
unit price figure includes not only these high-priced homes, but all
residential investment in the state arising from single and multi
family homes, manufactured homes, condominiums, seasonal homes
and rental apartments.
Behind the apparent anomaly of this finding, a number of
forces have been at work on housing in Maine through the past two
decades. A major factor is an apparent change in the mix of housing
products being built and sold in Maine during the 1980s. While the
single-family house is the standard product in the housing market,
19

Source: U.S. Census; Maine Dept, of
Economic and Community Development

many alternatives exist and the market for all these alternatives
operates as a single entity. As the price of conventional single
family new construction doubled during the 1970s, consumers have
apparently shifted to substitutes, including manufactured homes,
condominiums, existing and rehabilitated homes and homes in less
expensive parts of the state. Indeed, physical relocation has been

Regional Development
Of New Housing

much in evidence in Maine during the past two decades and much

Total Additions

of the pressure driving Maine residents to suburban and rural towns

Sagadahoc
Oxford

— and driving inmigrants into Maine — is the relatively lower cost

Hancock

of housing outside metropolitan areas.

Androscoggin
Kennebec
Penobscot

These substitution strategies have been operating in Maine
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to keep the average price of new housing units actually bought and
sold on the market virtually immobile in the 1980s. The slowdown
of real estate markets in southern Maine, price erosion in the

Regional Development
Of New Housing
Total Additions

Portland market, and the movement of sales and development
activity north into Lewiston-Auburn and Bangor have all worked to
undercut average new housing prices, just as the preponderance of

Piscataquis
Washington

market activity in southern Maine in the 1970s worked to push

Franklin

average prices rapidly higher. An increasing reliance on manufac

Somerset
Waldo

tured housing, self-contracting and owner-building, and an increas

Knox
Lincoln

ing concentration of professional and speculative building in the

Aroostook
3
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limited but lucrative custom home market similarly push the unit
price of new dwellings toward a lower level.
While the average price of new housing has been held stable

Figure 18

during the 1980s, the prices of existing homes have continued to

The volume of new housing
construction in Maine is concen
trated near the major urban
centers and in the suburban
counties adjacent to those
centers (top chart). In rural
Maine, Aroostook County contin
ues to outpace coastal develop
ment.

rise. Between 1977 and 1987, municipal valuations estimated by
the Maine Bureau of Taxation have more than doubled. These
valuations include both new and existing homes as well as commer
cial and industrial real estate and personal property used in business.
In part, this rise in the 1980s reflects a lag period during which
assessed valuations caught up with market prices, but the remainder
of the rise must logically reflect increases in the prices of existing

Source: Maine Dept, of Economic and
Community Development; State
Planning Office; U.S. Census

homes and business properties.
Regional variation in assessed valuations is also consider
able, with York County properties more than tripling in value,
20

Cumberland County nearly tripling, while Aroostook County prop
erties rose by only half-again and Kennebec and Piscataquis Coun
ties less than doubled.

Regional Growth
Regional Changes
In Valuation

The differences in regional valuations reflect underlying
differences in regional growth patterns. Growth in Maine has been
strongly regional during the 1970s and the 1980s, with the greatest
emphasis on just three counties in southern Maine. Growth rates
have been high in localized pockets of development along the coast

Sagadahoc p
Oxford
Hancock
Androscoggin
Kennebec
Penobscot
Cumberland

— particularly in Lincoln, Knox and Hancock counties — but these
rates measure growth from relatively small population bases, and

York
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coastal growth east of the Kennebec River has had relatively little
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impact on the size of the statewide population relative to the impact
Regional Changes
In Valuation

generated by southern Maine. Since 1985, growth has begun to
accelerate in the central Maine counties along the 1-95 Corridor, but
even with growth moving northward, southern Maine is projected
to continue to drive statewide population gains in the future.
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Hjboot

Washington
Franklin
Somerset
Waldo

The largest share of Maine’s population will continue to be

Knox
Lincoln

concentrated in the southern region, rising from 34 percent in 1980

Aroostook

to 36 percent in 1990 and into the 21st Century. The total population
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of the region will increase by nearly 100,000 persons and, by the
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year 2010, nearly half a million people wi II live in the three counties
— Cumberland, York and Sagadahoc — that make up Maine’s Figure 19
metropolitan core. More than half of this population will live in
Increases in property valuations

Cumberland County, but more than half of the growth will occur in have tracked growth in urban
parts of the state but appear to
York County.
have outpaced development in
rural Maine.

The central region, comprising the length of the Kennebec
Valley and the Midcoast, will grow steadily from 19 percent of the
state population in 1980 to 20 percent in 2010. The total population
of the region will increase by 50,000 persons to a four county total
of just over a quarter million people. Half of the total will live in
Kennebec County, which, like its regional neighbors Somerset and
Knox counties, will grow by about 10,000 persons through the
21

Source: Maine Bureau o l Taxation

period. The highest increase and the fastest growth will occur in
Lincoln County.
The eastern region, despite an increase of 40,000 persons,
will maintain the 23 percent share of the state population that it held
in 1980. Nevertheless, with 300,000 people in 2010, the five-county

Growth in Maine
Property Valuations

region will remain the state’s second largest. Half of the regional

(Billions o f Dollars)

total will live in Penobscot County, which will gain 10,000 persons
through the period.

But Hancock County will gain twice that

number to lead the pace of growth in the region.
The western region will also hold steady at about 15 percent
10
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of the state population with the addition of about 20,000 persons.
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Androscoggin will hold half of the nearly 200,000 regional total in
2010 and will, with its regional neighbors Oxford and Franklin
counties, gain between 5,000 and 10,000 persons through the
period. Within this range, Androscoggin County will add the fewest

Figure 20
Assessed values of real and
personal property in Maine have
virtually tripled in ten years,
principally because of rising
market values.
Source: Maine Bureau of Taxation

and Franklin County the greatest number of people.
The northern region, which contains only Aroostook County,
is projected to lose population, dropping from about 8 percent to
about 6 percent of the state total. Nevertheless The County will
remain M aine’s sixth-largest with a population o f75,000 in the year
2010. It should be noted, however, that this projection is likely to
be the least reliable of this series, since indicators of economic
growth in the Presque Isle-Caribou area during late 1988 and 1989
were simply too premature to be captured in the trend adjustments
on which these projections are based.

Growth in the Towns
Maine’s settlement pattern is also affected by the size of the
municipalities in which people choose to live. In this study, we have
used three broad categories of municipal size — cities of 10,000
persons or more, towns of between 2,500 and 10,000 persons, and
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villages of fewer than 2,500 persons. At this small level of size,
trend projections have no statistical reliability, and no attempt has
been made to distribute population by town.
In 1960, virtually half of Maine’s population lived in vil
lages and another third lived in cities. The village population of the
time amounted to close to half a million people spread through the

Regional Growth in
The Maine Population

whole state — about the same number as are expected to live in the
(000)

Census Scenario

southern region alone by 2010.
Through the following twenty years, urban to rural migra
tion had an important impact on these villages, which, ironically,
shows up in the 1980 Census as a loss of nearly a third of the village

1980

population. The population of the cities grew by about 50,000 but

H

remained at the 1960 share of about one third of the statewide total.
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The population of the towns, meanwhile, positively boomed, more
than doubling in population and climbing from a scant one fifth of
Regional Growth in
The Maine Population

the statewide total in 1960 to nearly two fifths in 1980.

Prosperity Scenario

Some of the growth in the towns reflects the effects of
classic post-war suburbanization on places like Hampden and
Cumberland.

But an important part of that growth after 1970

reflects the new phenomenon of urban to rural migration, or “exur
banization,” that has transformed places like Monmouth and New

■

South

IB Central 0

East

Gloucester through the past two decades. As these villages grew in
E3 West

CD North

size, they grew up in size category and, by the 1980 Census, had
become towns of greater than 2,500 population. Yet even by the mid
Eighties, after a period of substantial growth, villages like Lamoine,
Whitefield, Deer Isle, Jefferson, Castine, Mt. Dessert, Blue Hill, Figure 21
Litchfield, Manchester, Appleton, Damariscotta, Bethel, Bowdoin- Population growth statewide is
ham, Lincolnville, Arundel and Ogunquit remained below 2,500 dominated by Southern Maine,

under both our lowest and high
est growth scenarios, but future
growth in Bangor and its subur
ban counties will also be consid
Even as the effects of exurbanization were transforming erable. The emphasis on South
some villages into towns, others lost population between 1960 and ern Maine is even more pro
nounced under the high end or
1980 as the persistence of rural poverty in the northerly part of the Prosperity scenario.

population and many even below 1,000.

state took its toll. Indeed, structural poverty remains untouched in
r

Maine even by the unprecedented prosperity of the 1980s.
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Office o f

Vital Statistics

The state’s poverty population remained near 13 percent —
more than one person in seven — in 1987, precisely the same
percentage as in the 1970 and 1980 Census counts. Another 10,000
persons were added to the poverty rolls between 1980 and 1987, the
same number as were added through the entire 1970s.

While

regional breakdowns were not available in the 1987 data, the

The Maine Population
by Municipal Size

presence of significant numbers of two-earner working poor fami
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lies below the poverty level suggests an important geographical
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component may relate structural poverty in Maine to the location of
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By 1980, the population of Maine was divided in rough
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thirds between the state’s cities, villages and towns. When the same
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proportions are projected out to the population in 2010, the cities
gain about 60,000 people — another Portland by comparison — the
towns share a population of virtually half a million and the villages

Figure 22

remain nearly 100,000 persons below the population they held in
1960.

Maine’s suburban towns have
become the residential location of
choice for more than a third of
Yet this distribution by municipal size does not tell the
the population, but all municipal
size groups are projected to gain whole story of urban to rural migration.
population in the future.
Source: U.S. Census; Maine Office of
Vital Statistics

The Suburban Pattern
Besides compiling population counts for municipalities, the
Census Bureau also compiles counts for central places — village
and town centers — as distinct from outlying rural areas that are
politically part of the municipality but physically part of the open
countryside. Because of these central place counts, it is possible to
distinguish the populations of a Fort Kent center or a Winthrop
center or a Sanford center from the exurban populations of those
same towns.
In addition to defining three categories of municipal size,
therefore, we have also examined three categories o f local place
that are also based on population sizes: Rural with under 2,500;
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Suburban with between 2,500 and 10,000, and Urban with more
than 10,000 residents. In this analysis, however, neighborhood
rather than political boundaries define the limits of population size.
In contrast to the apparent loss in population experienced by
the smallest municipalities through 1980, the smallest places in

The Maine Population
by Size of Place

Maine have experienced tremendous growth. More than two-thirds

Census Scenario

of Maine’s population growth between 1940 and 1980 took place in
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rural neighborhoods. Only one seventh of the growth occurred in
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the built-up suburbs and one sixth occurred in urban neighborhoods.
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hood counts show that the largest places in Maine actually lost
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The settlement pattern by size of place in the coming century
may be heavily unbalanced toward the open countryside. By 1980,
more than half of the Maine population lived outside the state’s ^'9ure
village and town centers.

By the year 2010, another 100,000 Rural neighborhoods in cities and

persons may choose to move onto the state’s rural landscapes. The towns of all sizes have absorbed
almost all of the population

town and city centers, in contrast, gain only about 25,000 population growth in Maine since the 1960s.
and the village centers only slightly less.

Source: U.S. Census; Maine Office of
Vital Statistics

Yet, as has been made clear by the experience o f the 1970s
and 1980s, the jobs in Maine’s economy remain largely in or near
the fringes of the larger central places, despite the movement of the
population ever farther out into the countryside and of some
businesses into the suburban fringe. The result has been long com
mutes for Maine workers — more and more often at the rate of two
per household, each sometimes commuting in different directions
— and increasing levels of traffic and congestion on Maine roads.
In the most extreme cases, powerful employment centers
like Portland or Bath can triple in population every morning and
empty out again every night — generating peak load pressures on
roads, parking, waste disposal systems and on air quality. In effect,
the real populations of these employment centers are hidden, the
stresses on their infrastructures distorted and the revenues available
25

to them through the property tax inequitably depressed. Additional
growth through the next twenty years of about 15 percent in the
exurban population would suggest that regional approaches to
traffic and financing issues will move increasingly higher on the
public agenda.
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SECTION 4

MAINE’S INMIGRANTS

Inmigration was a major area of interest for the first Com
mission on Maine’s Future during the late 1970s, at a time when the

College Graduates in
The Maine Population
Percent of Migration Type

phenomenon was new to Maine and poorly documented. The first
Commission sponsored its own groundbreaking research in the area
and granted seed money for a long term University of Maine study
that continues to provide the most comprehensive analysis available
of Maine’s inmigrants. These efforts stimulated additional study by
state, private and academic researchers substantially improving our
understanding of inmigration and its effects on Maine.
Despite popular concern about “people from away,” inmi-

0 --------------- *■■■■............. I

Recent
Earlier
Returning
Inmigrants Inmigrants Mainers
Migration Type

Lifelong
Mainers

— Maine Average

^ ^

gration represents the smallest share of the population growth
pressures facing the state in the 1980s — about a third of the lnmi9rants. in general, and recent
inmigrants, In particular, have

percentage change and adding just over 2.5 percent of the overall higher levels of education than
population through the decade so far.
overa** Maine population, and

higher levels than the inmigrants
who moved to Maine before 1978.

A more important role played by inmigrants has been their
influence on the state’s demographic characteristics — levels of
income and education, occupations, age, family and employment
patterns — and on the social, political and cultural environment of
the state. Inmigration has brought more than just additional num
bers of people to Maine. Inmigrants have been on average younger,
more financially secure and better educated than Maine residents;
they typically hold better jobs, are more active politically and differ
somewhat in their values and belief systems.
Yet in other ways, inmigrants — who represent nearly a
third of our population — share many similarities with their native
Maine neighbors. They are preponderantly New Englanders, imbued
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Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

with the same sense of history and the same sense of place. They
value the state’s natural environment and share a concern for its
future. They gravitate toward small towns and rural places; they do
their part in making their communities work.

Net Inmigration
To Maine Counties
1980- 1986

The Impact of Inmigration
Maine, in 1989, has experienced a full generation of inmi
gration and has become home to a sizable inmigrant community.
Some of those who moved to Maine during that generation have
remained here and become part of their communities, while others
moved away again after a period of years. About 18 percent of
Maine’s inmigrants have been found to leave the state again within
five years. Others came here temporarily as college students, or
Gross Inmigration
To Maine Counties
1975 - 1980
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assigned to military bases or in temporary career moves to corporate
divisions in the state. Still others — about 20 percent — were
returning Maine natives who left to attend school or to accept
employment in another state.
In 1980, 255,000 of the 1.1 million people living in Maine
were born out of state and an additional 50,000 people were born in
another country — a total of 305,000 resident inmigrants represent
ing 27 percent of the population. The evidence of previous Census
counts and of tracking studies in the 1980s suggests that between
half and three quarters of a million people have moved to Maine
through the past twenty five years and that about 350,000 of those

Figure 25
Inmigration to Maine from out of
state is is strongly weighted to
urban counties (bottom chart)
but when the effect of Mainers
moving around the state or away
from Maine is taken into account,
southern and coastal counties
experience the greatest gains
(top chart).

people continue to reside in the state in 1989 — a rough third of the
total population. Nearly two-thirds of these inmigrants have moved
to Maine from the industrialized Northeast -— New England, the
Middle Atlantic states and the upper Midwest — and nearly half
from the neighboring New England states. More than one in five
come from Massachusetts alone.
While the the primary motivation bringing people to Maine

Source: Maine Office o f Vital Statis
tics; U.S. Census

has to do with quality of life rather than economic factors, the
distribution of inmigrants around the state, nevertheless, suggests a
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strong economic component may be present as well. During the
1975-1980 period, 46 percent of the gross inmigration occurred in
Cumberland, York and Penobscot counties, and another 16 percent
occurred in Androscoggin and Kennebec counties. These five
counties are the state’s most urbanized and contain the highest
concentrations of employment opportunities available in Maine.
The pattern of net migration may have an even stronger

Distribution of
Upper Incomes
Percent of Migration Type

urban-county component, especially in the 1980s. Between 1970
and 1980, 47 percent of the net inmigration occurred in York and
Cumberland counties alone. Between 1980 and 1986, that figure
had risen to 70 percent. York County absorbed 51 percent of the net
inmigration of the early 1980s, adding nearly 14,000 people through
Inmigrants Inmigrants

the six years.

" " Migration Type

Mainers

Mainers

— Maine Average

Distribution of Low
To Moderate Incomes

Waves of Migration

Percent of Migration Type

The demographic differences between inmigrants and long
time Mainers can be striking. Even more striking — because it is
unexpected — is the appearance of similar differences between
different groups of inmigrants.

Results of the Commission’s

research suggest that inmigrants differ as often among themselves
as they do from native Mainers — so much so that there appears to

Inmigrants Inmigrants
Migration Type

Mainers

Mainers

— Maine Average

have been two distinct waves of migration to Maine, each corre
sponding roughly to the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s and the Figure 26
first about half again larger than the second. Between these waves,

Maine’s newest inmfgrants are

differences in education, in income, in values and in attitudes are more likely to earn high incomes
and less likely to earn low in
comes than other groups in the
moved to Maine and those who have lived here all their lives.
Maine population. Earlier inmi
grants are more like natives at the
low end and more like newcom
For example, Seventies inmigrants were two and one half ers at the high end of the income
scale.

often as pronounced as the differences between those who have

times more likely to be employed in professional, executive and
managerial positions than was typical in the Maine population; they
were more than three times more likely to have a college degree;
they were one and one half times more likely to be young adults
between the ages of 20 and 34. Native Mainers, in the same studies,
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Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

were nearly twice as likely to be employed in blue collar, natural
resource and service occupations than were inmigrants and one and
one half times more likely to be over age 65.
Later inmigrants, however, are even younger and better
educated than their predecessors to Maine. Those who have arrived

The Maine Population
Under Age 44

in Maine in the past ten years continued to be three times more likely

Percent of Migration Type

to be college graduates than Mainers but also one and one half times
more likely than those who arrived more than ten years ago. Nearly
one newcomer in two had graduated from college in 1988, com
pared with one in three of those who moved to Maine more than ten
years ago and one in five of those who were bom in Maine.

Inmigrants Inmigrants
““

Migration Type

Mainers

Mainers

— Maine Average

Other demographic differences between Mainers and inmi
grants have also persisted during the 1980s, with the greatest gap

Figure 27

existing between long-time Mainers and the newest inmigrants,
while earlier inmigrants hold an intermediate position between the

Migration to Maine is predomi
nantly a function of youth, not
one of retirement. More than
three in four of the inmigrants of
the past ten years are still under
age 44 and more than half are still
underage 34.

other groups. Inmigrants, in general, continue to command higher

Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

$20,000. Only two in five of the longer-term inmigrants earn more

incomes than is typical for the Maine population, with those who
have arrived in the last ten years even better off than those who
arrived in the 1970s. Nearly half of the most recent arrivals earn
annual incomes over $30,000, and only one in four earn less then
than $30,000 a year and nearly the same number earn less than
$20,000. Among lifelong Mainers, only one in three earns more
than $30,000 a year and two in five earns less than $20,000.
The young adults who moved to Maine in the 1960s and
1970s and who have remained here have inevitably grown older,
weakening the tendency for inmigrants to be younger than the
general population of the state. Taking both waves of inmigrants
together, for example, one in five inmigrants is 65 years old or older,
compared to one in six native Mainers. Mainers and inmigrants are
equally likely to be either under age 34 or under age 50. But when
only the inmigrants of the last ten years are considered, more than
half are between the ages of 18 and 34 and fewer than one in five is
older than 50. When the earlier wave of migrants was studied in
1980 — that is, within ten years of having moved to Maine — 41
30

percent were between 18 and 34, while 53 percent of the current
generation of inmigrants are within that age range.

Value Systems of Inmigrants

Free Access to
Private Wilderness
1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

To some extent, these demographic differences appear to
carry through to core values and attitudes as well, although the
differences among Mainers, regardless o f their place o f birth, on
most questions rarely result in wide variations or diametrically
opposed positions.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to overemphasize these

Years in Maine

Inmigrants

— Mainers

differences, either between groups of inmigrants or between inmi
grants and Maine natives. Where divisions exist, they are almost
always slight, reflecting at best slight shifts in the direction of

Managing
Maine's Growth
1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

variation — that is in the size of the minority within groups — away
from a clearly dominant central tendency that seems to be common
to all Mainers regardless of birthplace.
Indeed, the starkest divisions occur most often between two
groups of inmigrants. The following discussion draws upon data
gathered in two random polls of opinions and value systems
completed by the Commission in early 1989. Specific poll results
are found at the end of this section.
Figure 28

At the core of the first wave of migration — the wave that When asked if “The people of
came to Maine seeking a quality of life embracing personal auton Maine should have the continued
right to use private wilderness

omy and an environmental ethic — an unusual group of newcomers and forest land at no cost,” the
moved to the state between 1972 and 1977. In so far as there ever shortest and longest term inmi

grants held views the closest to

was a “back to the land” movement in Maine, it would have been long time Mainers on average.
heavily represented in this group.

Motivated by strongly-held The inmigrants of the middle
1970s showed the strongest

ideals in the 1970s, this group in 1988 is consistently more liberal degree of concern when asked if
than any other group o f Mainers, holding a high level of trust in “Managing growth in Maine may

very well disrupt private business

government and an expectation that the resources of government be and undercut prosperity.”
used to curb excesses in business, to protect the environment and to
address human need.
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Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

In contrast to the inmigrants of the mid-seventies, a second
group of inmigrants is unusual for being consistently more conser
vative than any other group and often more conservative than Maine
natives. This group arrived in Maine between 1978 and 1982, atime
of gasoline lines and Iranian hostages, of dying manufacturing
Government's
Responsibility
1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

industries and the deepest recession since the 1930s. Their arrival
appears to have inaugurated the second wave of migration to Maine
— a wave characterized by more education, higher incomes and
more conservative values. Faced with a world vastly changed from
the generation of prosperity and social experimentation that had
gone before, the inmigrants of 1978 - 82 tended, in 1988, to have
neoconservative, or perhaps more accurately neotraditionalist atti
tudes — suspicious of government and social spending, somewhat
favorable toward economic development and property rights, split
on the environment and social change.

Doubt Abiltiy to
Affect Government
1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

The second wave of inmigrants appears to have come to
Maine not only for environmental quality but also for the opportu
nities the state provides for traditional family life. Housing costs,
although rising when they arrived, were still relatively low com
pared to those in other states, holding open the possibility of a
lifestyle centered on a home of one’s own, a backyard, children. In
1988, nearly half of inmigrants to the state during the previous ten
years lived in homes with another adult and children, compared to
less then two in five of all Maine adults who share that traditional

Figure 29

lifestyle. They were less likely than natives or earlier inmigrants to

When asked if “It’s government’s
responsibility to assure such
basics as housing and health
care” or “People like me are
unable to affect or change the
policies of government,” the inmi
grants of the early 1980s tend to
be more like long-time Mainmers
than they are like other inmi
grants on average.

live alone, to live in families without children or to be single parents.

Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

Family values tend to be quite strong among the mmigrants of the
1980s and they tend to resemble native Mainers in this area more
than they resemble the earlier inmigrants.
Yet neither of these generally consistent philosophies is
untempered. The usually liberal and environmentalist inmigrants of
the 1972-77 period, for example, are the most concerned of all
Mainers that growth management may threaten economic prosper
ity and are the least threatened by the recent pace of change in the
state. Similarly, the usually conservative inmigrants o f the 1978-82
period are the least willing of all Mainers to trade environmental for
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economic quality and find the pace of change nearly as threatening
as do long-time Mainers
Between natives and inmigrants in general, what differ
ences in attitude exist tend to fall into two types. On some issues —
education and the “special” character of life in Maine are particu
larly good examples — inmigrants’ attitudes often tend to become
more like those of long-time Mainers, the longer they have lived in
the state. On other issues — economics, government and moral
values, for example — a strong “U”-shaped trend is often evident
as years of residency in the state increase. When this pattern is
present, the most recent inmigrants tend to most closely resemble
long-time Mainers, while the inmigrants of the 1972-1977 period
tend to display the greatest differences. Where these differences can
be generalized, they are strongest and occur most often in the sphere
of moral values. Inmigrants generally tend to be more tolerant than

Figure 30

natives of gays, of cohabitation, of working women, of freedom of

When asked if “The most im
portant purpose of an educa
tion is to prepare a person to
get a job,” inmigrants tend to
come closer to the native
attitude, the longer they live in
Maine.

information and of the decline of religious influence on social
customs. However, there is a tendency toward the re-emergence of
traditional values among the second wave of inmigrants.
Mainers and inmigrants generally tend to be closest together
on their environmental attitudes, although native Mainers tend to
place a higher priority on job creation than on the preservation of
natural conditions. Yet they are less inclined than inmigrants to
tolerate degradation of air or water quality for the sake of business
expansion. Mainers place a greater emphasis on the natural envi
ronment in defining quality of life than do inmigrants, while
inmigrants place more emphasis on Maine’s rural and undeveloped
character. Mainers are less inclined than are inmigrants to recog
nize aright to post private land at the expense of recreational access,
yet they also extend greater recognition to the property rights of
beach and wilderness owners.
Mainers and inmigrants are also relatively close in their
attitudes toward education. Inmigrants tend to be slightly more
financially supportive of the schools, but both groups place the same
relative emphasis on increased school spending in their scales of
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Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

priorities. Both groups also tend slightly toward the belief that the
schools are failing to prepare the present generation of children for
the future.

Inmigrants are somewhat more inclined to see the

importance of lifelong learning than are Mainers, but both groups
strongly agree on that importance.

Mainers are more likely to

consider jobs, rather than education for its own sake, as the purpose
of the schools, but inmigrants’ attitudes about the vocational out
come of education tend to become much more like those of Mainers,
the longer they have lived in the state.
Mainers are considerably more chauvinistic about the spe
cial qualities of the state than are inmigrants and hold to considera
bly more traditional social, moral and religious customs. Mainers
see life in their state as simpler than life elsewhere in the country,
they believe their children will be happier in life if they remain in
Figure 31
When asked if “We would be
better off if more women stayed
at home to raise their children,"
long time Mainers take a much
more traditional view than inmi
grants on average.
Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

Maine, and they wouldn’t leave themselves for better homes, jobs
or opportunities. But they fear this uniqueness may be at risk and
that Maine may become more like the rest of the nation. Inmigrants,
no matter how long they have lived in the state, tend to place
considerably less emphasis on M aine’s uniqueness and conse
quently see less of a threat. Inmigrants do tend to become more
committed to Maine with length of residency, however, and to
believe their children will be better off if they also adopt that
commitment as adults.
The widest divergence between native Mainers and inmi
grants occurs in the sphere of social, moral and religious values
followed by a similar, but somewhat less wide divergence in
attitudes toward government. The inmigrants of the 1978-82 period
are significantly out of step with other inmigrants on these issues
and much more like long-time Mainers. Yet even compared with
these conservative inmigrants, Mainers hold distinctly different
values. Native Mainers do not approve of a “gay lifestyle,” of gay
teachers or of heterosexual cohabitation; believe society would be
better off if women remained in the home, that children need twoparent families and that young people have “too much” freedom in
present-day society. They do not strongly object to community
censorship of libraries; they believe society would be better off if
34

religion were more prominent in daily life; they seek support for
their decisions in prayer. Inmigrants tend to be more tolerant of
homosexuality and cohabitation, embrace expanding roles for
women, strongly object to censorship and assign a minor role to
religion in private and public life.
The Structure
of the Family

Mainers tend to see corporate and bureaucratic power as

1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

compelling in governmental decision-making and their own influ
ence consequently reduced. They strongly espouse a philosophy of
self-reliance and only mildly support government provision of
“basics” like housing and health care. They tend to place a lower
priority on government spending generally, regardless of category,
than do inmigrants. Inmigrants display a strong faith in their ability
to influence government decisions, discount the power of corpora
tions and bureaucracies and see government’s job, in part, as
providing basic social services. In each of these instances, the 197882 inmigrants show substantially less faith in government and less
commitment to its social role than do other groups, but they do not

Cohabitation
Without Marriage
1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

diverge as widely from the inmigrant norm as do long-time Mainers.
Inmigrants tend to place higher priorities than do long-time
Mainers on public spending of all kinds, but tend to place the same
relative emphasis on spending options as they rank their priorities.
On only two options — job training at the bottom and health care
at the top — do inmigrants place a lower relative priority than do
Figure 32

long-time Mainers.
Health care is the top spending priority among native
Mainers, butranks second among inmigrants, after Elderly Services
and the VTI System, which share their first place priority. Inmi
grants place job training programs at the bottom of their priority list,
while native Mainers group Job Training, Roads, Housing and the
University of Maine System together as the lowest priorities.
Both groups place the K-12 School System, Environmental
Quality and Waste Management in the middle range of their priority
rankings, but nearly one inmigrant in four considers the K -12 Sysem
to be the single top priority for public spending. The closest native
35

When asked if “Children need
both a mother and a father at
home in order to be properly
raised,” the inmigrants of the
1980s are on average more like
long time Mainers than they are
like the inmigrants of the 1970s.
When asked if “It can be healthy
for people to live together before
marriage,” the Inmigrants of the
1970s and the 1980s differ among
themselves, on average, but differ
even more from long time Main
ers.
Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

Figure 33
When asked to pick a top priority
from a list of ten options, and to
rank the others for more, same or
less spending, Mainers and
inmigrants reveal a close similar
ity in how they rank their priori
ties but inmigrants look for
slightly higher spending across
the board.
Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

Mainers come to that level of consistency is the choice by nearly one
in five of Elderiy Services as the top priority, while another one in
five place Environmental Quality alone at the top. Both groups tend
to be somewhat favorable to increased spending on their lowest
priorities and quite favorable to spending increases for their top
priorities. But nearly a fifth of the inmigrants and a tenth of the
natives would cut job training funds, while another tenth of each
group would do the same to the University.
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SECTION 5

THE BABY BOOMERS

Baby boomers account for more than one-third o f the total
Maine population and number more than two in five of all adults, but
the full weight of the adult baby boom has only begun to be fe lt in
Maine society. The youngest members of this generation reached
voting age only in 1980. Some remained college students until the
mid-1980s. Only since 1987 has the entire generation been fully
invested in adulthood, beyond the age of post-adolescence and set
on a direction for their lives.
Yet the generation is still not yet fully cohesive and remains
split between an older group, over age 35 and into middle age, and Figure 34
a younger group still between 25 and 34 and in their prime family,
The movement of the baby boom

household and career formation years. Different preoccupations generation into middle age will
are still likely to concern the two parts of this generation and their continue through the 1990s,
resulting in a concentration of

differences in lifestyle are likely to be reflected in differences of political, social and economic
political interest. But by the mid-1990s, the baby boom will be power at a single stage of the life
consolidated in the common outlooks and attitudes o f middle age,
representing a concentration o f power — political, economic,
social and cultural— in keeping with their disproportionately large
share o f the whole population.
By 1995, more than 350,000 Mainers will be between the
ages of 35 and 54; in the first decade of the coming century the
population of this age group will rise to and remain near 400,000.
At the turn of the 21st Century, the influence of the baby boom on
public policy will be certain, overwhelming and unprecedented.
The baby boomers share a number of demographic similari
ties with M aine’s inmigrants.

Indeed, more than one third of
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cycle.
Source: U.S. Census

Maine’s baby boomers are inmigrants, and half of those moved
here within the past ten years. Nearly half of M aine’s baby boomers
have lived in the state all their lives, and another one in five have
returned to Maine after having lived out of state for part of their
lives.
Educational Attainment
in the Maine Population

Despite the rise in divorce rates and decline in fertility that

Percent of Age Group

has been continuous throughout the baby boom generation’s move

100

ment into adulthood, only one in three baby boom households are
childless and only seven percent are single parent. More than three
in five boomer households consist of two adults and at least one
child. One in four are childless couples.
Like the inmigrants, baby boomers are relatively highly
Under
Twelve

High
School

Some
College

College
Grad

Figure 35

educated — only seven percent have not completed high school,
compared with twice that number among Mainers o f all ages — and
nearly half have had at least some college. More than one in four
have obtained a college degree compared with one in five of all

Educational attainment rates
improved at both ends of the
spectrum in the baby boom
generation, with fewer students
leaving school before graduating
from high school and more
staying on through college
graduation. Younger generations
are likely to improve these rates
still further, but many were still in
school when this poll was con
ducted.
Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

Maine adults.

Yet the baby boomers are somewhat less well

educated than are inmigrants, among whom more than half have
attended college and one in three hold college degrees.
In keeping with their higher than average levels of educa
tional attainment, the baby boomers also command higher than
average incomes.

Two in five earn household incomes over

$30,000 a year and nearly three in four earn over $20,000. No other
age group matches these earnings, and only the most recent inmi
grants exceed them, with nearly half earning more than $30,000 a
year.
The baby boomers’ earnings levels reflect their unusually
high rates of participation in the labor force — by far the highest
among all Mainers. A key to this high participation level is the
unusually large percentage of women between 25 and 44 in the
workforce. More than nine in ten of the men and nearly eight in ten
of the women in the baby boom generation were working in 1988,
three in four of them full-time. Barely more than half of all Maine
adults work full time, and only seven in ten work at all.
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With nearly two-thirds of the baby boomers already over
age 35 and into middle age, a preview of the direction their influence
will take Maine can be estimated from the values, priorities and
political judgements they make today. The following discussion
draws upon data gathered in two random polls of opinions and value
systems completed by the Commission in early 1989. Specific poll
results are found at the end of this section.

Age and Value Systems
Like inmigrants, baby boomers differ most from the larger
Maine population in their moral values and in their attitudes toward
social and family structure. Moreover, these differences are typi Figure 36
cally reflected in the attitudes of the generations younger than the
When asked about their social,

baby boom as well. Thus, with respect to religion and to social and moral and religions values, in
sexual customs, a strong break with the past is evident between questions like “I usually attend a
place of worship at least once a

populations older than and younger than age 44. The generations month,” the generations younger
under 44 tend to be less religious than their elders, with the baby and older than age 44 reveal
boomers the least churched, but with their juniors even less likely
to be oriented toward prayer, toward the primacy of spiritual values
or to the positive influence of religion on society..
Opposition to library censorship, to limiting new roles for
women and to limiting the freedoms of modern children are also
stronger among those younger than 44 than it is among those older
than 44, but the level of opposition can tend to weaken somewhat
with age. Baby boomers hold substantially different views on these
questions than do older generations, but they are not as “socially
progressive” in these areas as are the generations even younger than
themselves. The moral split between old and young is most evident
on the question of cohabitation, which younger generations believe
to be healthy and which older generations oppose.
Baby boomers are the least committed generation to the
two-parent lifestyle, where the split between young and old is also
39

diverging attitudes.
Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

evident, but the generations younger than the baby boom may be
moving back to a more traditional position. All age groups are
deeply divided within each generation over tolerance of the gay
lifestyle, with a consistent two fifths of persons of any age in favor
of tolerance and an equally consistent two fifths opposed. Younger
generations tend to be slightly more tolerant than older generations

The Role
of Women

of gay teachers and the baby boomers the most tolerant of all.

1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

The split between the generations is also evident in other
attitudes, but the differences between Mainers of different ages is
seldom as pronounced as in their moral attitudes. The split tends to
take two forms.
---------- 1---------- 1---------- 1

2 -\

18-24

25-44
Age Groups

45-64

65+

— All Ages

The most common pattern occurs when the baby boomers
and the generation that follows them hold exactly the same values
on average, while the generations older than age 44 tend to become

Figure 37
When asked if “We would be
better off if more women stayed
at home to raise their children,” a
wide gap is revealed between the
generations and that gap may be
widening.
Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

more different with age. This pattern occurs repeatedly on attitudes
toward education, government and the environment, as well as in a
more extreme form on moral and cultural attitudes.
Thus, Mainers younger than age 44 tend to be less commit
ted to the philosophy of self-reliance, to be less suspicious of the
power of big business in government and to be more confident of
their own ability to influence public policy. They are less likely than
their elders to be dissatisfied with school performance, more likely
to value the environment over economic interests and less likely to
be threatened by the economic and population growth that has been
changing Maine in recent years.
A second pattern also occurs repeatedly, in which the split
between the generations is moderated by a tendency for values to
change with age. When this pattern is present, attitudes tend to
change evenly with age with the baby boomers holding values
somewhere between the values held by persons younger and per
sons older than themselves.
This pattern affects Mainers sense of family responsibility
for their aged parents; attitudes toward Maine’s simple lifestyle and
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toward the risk that the state is becoming just like everywhere else;
attitudes toward the need for a college education; attitudes toward
the value of inmigration to the state; levels of commitment to stay
in Maine and attitudes toward a neighbor’s private property rights.
This pattern also influences moral and social attitudes, some of
which also tend to moderate with age, but even where attitudes

The Philosophy
of Self Reliance

moderate, the social gap between the generations is wide.
Each of these common patterns provides conflicting evi
dence toward the resolution of one of the most significant uncertain
ties affecting M aine’s and the nation’s future in virtually all areas of
human activity from government to business; from technology to
social policy.

Age Groups

— All Ages

The unanswered question is How will the baby boomers
react to age? Will they remain committed to the political idealism

The Freedom
of Youth

and social revolution, to the innovation and unconventionality of

1 = Agree : 5 = Disagree

their youth? Or will they follow earlier generations and become
more politically and socially conservative as they age? How the
baby boomers answer this question can change our assumptions
about the rate of inmigration, the level of social spending, the future
of environmental preservation, the global competitiveness of our
national economy, the size of the labor force and the way schools
will be restructured.

Age Groups

— All Ages

The evidence of the first pattern suggests that the baby Figure 38
boomers are maintaining their youthful ideals and that the “genera„

.

When asked if “People should

tion gap or the 1960s represented a basic change in cultural values re|y more on themselves rather
that will continue into the future. The utter lack of difference than ask the government to do so
,

,

,,

,

„

much” or “Young people have

between the baby boomers and very young adultsbetween 18 and t00 muCh freedom today,” gen24 that characterizes this pattern provides evidence of a level of erational differences are some.

.

. . .

continuity that is in itself a fundamental break with the past.
The evidence of the second pattern, however, suggests that

times very pronounced (top

chart) and sometimes moderate
with increasing age (bottom
chart).

the baby boomers are indeed changing with age, making a smooth Source:
transition from the preoccupations of youth to those of parents, of
breadwinners and eventually of retirees. The strong presence of
both patterns may suggest that the baby boomers will indeed modify
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Market Decisions, Inc.

their attitudes as they grow older, but that they will make those
modifications in ways fundamentally different than did the mem
bers of previous generations.
In a number of their attitudes, the baby boomers differ from
all other age groups, although the intensity of these differences is
rarely great.
Of all age groups in Maine, baby boomers are the most
opposed to private beach ownership, the least likely to see job
preparation as the purpose of education, the most committed to
lifelong learning, the most satisfied (of those young enough to have
children in the schools) with the way schools teach creativity, the
least likely to object to gay teachers, the least likely to see the need
for the traditional two-parent family structure, the least likely to
attend church, the least likely to mistrust bureaucracy, and the most
likely to look forward to the future.
There are few generational differences among Maine people
in how they define quality of life. People over 50 place slightly
higher stress on the state’s natural environment, while baby boom
ers place slightly higher stress on M aine’s rural, undeveloped
character. Baby boomers also place a bit more emphasis on low
crime rates and the small size of the drug culture, and place less
emphasis on economic climate than other people under age 65.
Figure 39

Baby boomers tend to have different spending priorities

When asked if “It’s government’s
than does the Maine population as a whole. While Mainers in
responsibility to assure such
basics as housing and health
general as well as the baby boomers tend to favor somewhat higher
care” or “People like me are
government spending on all of the ten public priority areas meas
unable to affect or change the
policies of government,” Mainers ured in the Commission’s polling, baby boomers place a higher than
sometimes show a pattern of
average priority on only two of those items — Roads and Job
changing attitudes with age and
sometimes show a gap between
Training. They place a lower than average priority on the University
the generations.

of Maine, Housing Assistance and Elderly Services, with the

Source: Market Decisions, Inc.

University their lowest priority of all.
On other spending items, the baby boomers place identical
priorities to Mainers in general on the K-12 School System and
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Figure 40
When asked to pick a top priority
from a list of ten options, and to
rank the others for more, same or
less spending, baby boomers
reveal a somewhat different
ranking and pattern of priorities
than do Maine people generally,
while their willingness to spend
tends to be near or slightly below
the average for all ages.
Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

Waste Management as mid-level priorities, and on the VTT System,
Environmental Quality and Health Care as a three-way tie for top
priority.
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SECTION 6

THE CHANGING AGE STRUCTURE

Life Cycle Groups in
The Maine Population
(000)

Projecliond to 2010

Societies can differ greatly in the age structures of their
populations. Frontier societies, for example, usually have young
populations while more settled societies have older populations.
Thus, New England, one of the oldest settled regions of North
America, has a population in which one person in three is over age
forty-five while Alaska, a frontier society, has only one person in six
as old as age forty-five.
Human biology and psychology, together with cultural
norms specifying what activities are appropriate for different ages,
make the age structure of a society an important determinant of its

Figure 41
The changing age structure of
Maine society will be reflected in
a greater emphasis on the con
cerns of the latter half of the life
cycle

character.
o

A younger population will be more fecund than
an older one. The character of a younger society,
therefore, will be shaped more by the needs and
activities of children than will an older society.

Source: U.S. Census

o

Death and sickness will be more prevalent in an
older society than in a younger one. Death and
sickness, therefore, will have a greater effect on
the character of an older society than they will on
the character of a younger society.

o

Younger people tend to take more and greater
risks than do older people. Risk-taking behavior
can have both negative and positive results:
highway accidents, alcohol and drug use and
criminal activity among the negative outcomes;
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business formations and geographical mobility
among the positive. Both types of results will,
consequently, be more prevalent in a younger
than an older society.
The cultural norms of modern, industrial societies

The Maine Population
50 Years Old and Older

encourage young people to attend school for

Projections to 2010

twelve to twenty years and encourage workers
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to retire at age sixty or sixty five. The culture,
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society more while the culture, organization and
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The age structure of Maine society will change over the next
few decades as the population becomes older. Much of that change Figure 42
will produce predictable effects in patterns that have been estab
About an eighth of the Maine

lished for generations. Some of that change will be unpredictable population is shifting from under
as the circumstances of a new century impose themselves on the age 40 to over age 40 and the
population between 45 and 54 will

character of our society. But even when change is unpredictable, it double by 2010.
does not have to be unexpected.

Source: U.S. Census

The major structural change in Maine society between 1986
and 2010 will be the shift of roughly an eighth of the population from
under age 40 to over age 40 — that is, the “middle aging” of the baby
boom. There will also be an “old aging” trend in Maine as the
number o f persons over age 80 increases by 20,000, rising from one
percent of the state population in 1986 to two percent in 2010.
Within these two broad trends, continuous increases are projected
for only two more-tightly defined age groups — one between 45
and 54, which will nearly double from 109,000 to 210,000, and one
over age 85, which will also nearly double from 17,000 to 32,000.
The populations of all other age groups will decline during some
periods and increase during others.
The small Depression-era generation will keep the age
group between 70 and 79 virtually unchanged in 2010 and will
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trigger a five percent decline among persons in their sixties — the
population of new retirees— during the 1990s. The small Vietnam
War generation and the Recession-era generation bom in the late
1970s and early 1980s will trigger a similar five-percent reduction
in the population of young adults between 25 and 44 — the present
age of the baby boom. By 2005, when these “baby bust” generations
begin to turn 40, the middle-aging trend will begin to slow by 3,000
to 5,000 persons a year.
The pattern of structural change in the Maine population can
be seen more clearly by considering the whole population of the
state within five basic stages of the life cycle — that is, in the
lifesfy/es characteristic of children (birth to 17), young adults (18
to 34), middle age adults (35-54), retirement-oriented adults (5569) and senior citizens (70 and older).

Figure 43

The middle age population of about 400,000 persons will be
more or less constant after the turn of the century following a period

Growth in Maine’s retired popula
tion will virtually stop after 1995
and then begin to grow again
even more rapidly ten years later.
This growth will continue to
accelerate for much of the follow
ing two decades.
Source: U.S. Census

of rapid acceleration toward a peak around 2005 that has already
begun. This group will represent the largest single age group in the
overall population. The fastest growing population will be the
group between 55 and 69 years old, the ages just before and just after
retirement. These middle age lifestyles hold the primary benefits of
the aging trend — the benefits of peak lifetime earnings, greater
family and social stability, and higher productivity in the jobs which
they will continue to hold through most of the years between 1990
and 2010. If the average retirement age remains near 65 — neither
falling as has been occurring during the recent past norrising as may
occur if severe labor shortages mark the coming decades — actual
retirements should not begin to accelerate until around 2011. The
share of the retirement-oriented population between 65 and 69 will
grow only from 49,000 in 1986 to 55,000 in 2010 — an increase of
about twelve percent over 25 years.
A preview of the costs associated with the aging trend in the
years following 2010 will be in evidence in a roughly 20,000-person
increase in the population most genuinely at risk of failing health,
reduced independence and eroding wealth — those over age 70,
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who will increase as a group by 21 percent by 2010. The most rapid
increase in this age group, however, is occurring now and will begin
to moderate after 1995. S low growth in the senior citizen population
will continue through about 2015, when the influence of the septua
genarian baby boom will begin to be felt.
The population of children and adolescents will vary by only
about four percent above and below a 300,000 person baseline
throughout the period. By 2010 the number of children under age
17 — that is, those born after 1990 — will have fallen to near the
numbers born during the Depression and Second World War, and
will represent a much smaller share of a much larger population than
was living in the state between 1930 and 1945. The decline in the
childhood population reflects the continuing decline in the number
of young adults available to be their parents. As the youngest baby
boomers move into middle age through the mid-1990s, the 18-34
year old population will tumble by 15 percent through 2010.
While M aine’s population is aging, then — both in the
number of people over age 40 and in the number over age 70 — the
younger group is expanding twice as rapidly as is the older group.
Both trends will slow after the 1990s and growth in the over 70
population will accelerate again around the year 2020 when the
baby boom begins to reach advanced age. The stresses of that
generational event are virtually certain to reverberate through
society in unprecedented challenges to long-established systems of
medicine and health care, social service, government, economics,
ethics and family relationships. But during the period 1990 through
2010, Maine is likely to reap the benefits of the structural shift
toward an older population, leavi ng the costs to come due during the
following period from 2010 to 2040 and beyond.
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PART 2

THE EFFECTS
OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
ON MAINE’S FUTURE

SECTION 1

LIFESTYLES

Much of the change in M aine’s size, its age structure and its

Maine Families
and Households
Percent of All Households

economy will be experienced at the household level. As with the

Young Singles

population in general, age and fertility will have the greatest impact

Grown Families
Mid-age Singles

on household structure through the coming twenty years. But

Elderly Couples

changing levels of income, spending patterns and use of time will

Single Parents

also affect life and lifestyles at the household level in Maine’s

Young Families
Elderly Singles

future.
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Maine’s households can be classified on the basis of age and
marital status and of whether children are present in the household.

Figure 44

The total household population of the state can be accounted for,
without overlap, by nine basic household types.

Maine’s aging population is
reflected in the changing family
structure, which shows relative
losses in younger household
types — Young Singles, Single
Parents and Couples with Pres
choolers — and gains in the older
types.

The nine household types are divided into three age ranges —
Young (15 to 34), Middle Age (35 to 64) and Elderly (over 65).
Within these age ranges, households are grouped by marital status
— Single and Couples — and by the presence or age of children —
No Children, Single Parents, Preschool Children (under 6),

Source: U.S. Census; Office of
Technology Assessment

School-age Children (6 to 17) and Grown Children (over 17).
Couples with school age children account for the largest
proportion of all Maine households — nearly one in five —
followed closely by Couples without children — about one in six.
Eight of the nine household types are likely to increase in numbers
in the 21st Century, while one — Young Singles — is projected to
fall by about 1,000. T wo others— Couples with preschool Children
and Single Parents — are projected to increase slightly in numbers
but to decline as a proportion o f all households.
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With these three exceptions, little structural change is pro
jected for Maine’s households — the remaining six types are
projected to gain relative strength in the household mix, but by
between only one-half and one percent.
The Household
Time Budget

Household incomes are also projected to rise, by the greatest
amount for young and middle-age couples, and by the smallest

Major Demands
Work

amount for single people of all ages. Elderly Couples and Single
Parents are projected to experience intermediate income gains.
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Time, like money, is also an important household resource
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and changes in the use of time are likely to have a major impact on
future lifestyles.

While projections of future time use are not

The Household
Time Budget

available, significant changes have occurred nationally in the past
decade, which provide a useful look at the role of time in personal

Commitment Demands
Child Care
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life.
Americans spent more time working and commuting to and

Family Travel
Eat at
Housework
3

from work between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, and spent
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less time on most forms of leisure, civic and educational activity.
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Men spent an extra hour a week on housework, while women cut
The Household
Time Budget

back by nearly four hours. Even after these adjustments, women did
twice as much housework as men and overall time spent on
housework fell.

Leisure Demands
Organizations
Eat out
Leisure T ravel

Both men and women spent less time on child care, but time

Recreation
Social
Other Media
Elec. Media

spent on shopping increased slightly. Time spent eating declined—
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both at home and eating out — but twice the amount of time saved

H
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on “fast food” was committed to personal care — sleep, personal
hygiene and physical exercise.

Figure 45
Americans are putting more time

Television watching and other electronic diversions re- |nto work and into taking care of
ceived less attention in the 1980s, while books, newspapers, maga- themselves, and cutting back on
their leisure time and routine jobs

zines and other media received a slight boost. Leisure travel gained around the house,
importance as a recreational activity at the expense of most other
uses of free time.
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Source: U.S. Census; Office of
Technology Assessment

Empty Nests
Almost three quarters of Maine households will have no
children in the home in 2010. Although half of Maine households
in 1960 had children living at home, this share had declined by 1988
Kmpty Nests in
The Maine Population
(000)

Households With and

to 35 percent and will continue to decline to below 30 percent by
2010. Associated with this change will be an additional decline in
mean household size from 3.3 persons in 1960 and 2.6 in 1987 to 2.3
in 2010.
The presence of children in the home requires substantial
investments of time, energy and money for their care and socializa

Children 0-17

E3 2005

No or Grown
Children
■

1980

tion. The increasing proportion of households without children
will, therefore, free substantial household resources for other uses.
Children in the home link adults to the other children and the

Figure 46

youth cultures of their communities. As the proportion of house-

The smaller proportion of Maine

holds with children declines, therefore, fewer households will have
contacts with children and children’s activities in their communi-

households with children present
will affect public and private
priorities for the use of time and
money
Source: U.S. Census

ties-

The result will be increased segregation of the worlds of
adults and the worlds of children. It will become more difficult to
recruit adults to supervise and participate in youth activities, such as
scouting, Little League, Sunday school and others, and to obtain
voter support for public expenditures for education and youth
services. This prospect poses a major challenge to state and local
policy makers in the coming two decades.
The projected decline in the proportion of households with
children between 1988 and 2010 reflects two changes in the age
structure of the Maine population — an increase in the proportion
of adults whose children have grown up and left home and a decline
in the number of women in the principal child-bearing years.
The Census Bureau’s population projections assume a slight
increase in fertility — the average lifetime number of children bom
per woman — over the next quarter century. If the Bureau is wrong
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and fertility continues to decline as it has for the past two decades,
then the proportion of households without children in 2010 will be
even larger than is projected here.
Most children turn 18 before their parents turn 50. Conse
quently, few adults over age 50 still have children under age 18

The Maine Population
Aged 55 to 64

living at home. In Maine in 1988, for example, two-thirds of the

Projections to 2010

householders age 50 to 54 and ninety percent of those age 55 to 60
had no children under age 18. The population age 50 and older is
projected to grow by 140,000 persons, accounting for nearly half of
all adults by 2010. This trend will mean a substantial increase in the
number of households with no young children in the home.

Financial Well-being

Figure 47
A sharp increase in the number of

More Maine households will be financially better off in Mainers at the peaks of their
2010 relative to their lifetime earnings and accumulation of assets. careers and personal wealth in

the late 1990s will fuel discretion

In an economy similar to that of the 1980s, they would be absolutely ary spending and open a short
better off, as well. In an economy crippled by doubled or quad period of relative prosperity.
rupled energy prices, or one in which U.S. industrial power were in so u rce;
eclipse on the world stage, they would probably be worse off in real
terms, but still better off than they would be under the same poor
economic conditions but at an earlier stage of the life cycle.
This relative improvement will result from an increase in the
population ages 55 to 64, a group at the peak of its earning power and
base of personal assets. This age group is the one that occupies the
senior executive, professional and craft positions in society and
which supplies the savings for capital investment. Its children have
left home, reducing household expenses. It has built up assets in
housing, in durable goods and in cash savings.
Younger age groups are net borrowers as they use credit to
buy and furnish homes and get started in life. Older age groups
begin spending their capital for retirement. The income per house
hold member between 55 and 64 is 25 percent higher and its net
53

U.S. Census

worth two and a half times larger that the overall averages for the
general population.
Growth in this key population, however, will not begin until
after the turn of the century. From 1986 to 1995, there will be a
decline in the 55 to 64 year old population as the Depression era
generation passes through this stage of the life cycle. A 61,000
person increase is projected for this age group by 2010 — 56,000
of which will occur after the turn of the century.

Geographic Mobility
Residential mobility will decline sharply between 1986 and
2010.
Figure 48
The dominance of the baby bust
generations in the years of young
adulthood will have repercus
sions on inmigration and birth
rates, labor and housing markets.
Source: U.S. Census

This will mean more stability, less turnover and fewer

newcomers in Maine communities. It will also mean slower rates
of housing turnover and residential development, which can be
expected to dampen the pressure of demand on real estate markets.
Since demand is only one element driving housing prices
upward, it is uncertain whether a slowdown in residential mobility
will be accompanied by improvements in housing affordability.
The share of household incomes spent on housing is not projected
to increase, however, but the dollar cost of the average new housing
unit is projected to rise from near $70,000 in 1988 to $87,000 in the
mid-1990s and to $117,000 at the turn of the century.
The slowing of residential mobility will result from a
decline in the population age 18 to 34. Persons of this age are highly
mobile, with one in three moving each year. The older population
is much more stable, with only one in ten moving each year. As the
18 to 34 year old population declines, therefore, and the population
over 35 increases, the geographic mobility of the population as a
whole will decline. The population age 18 to 34 is projected to
decrease by 53,000 persons between 1986 and 2010, a 16 percent
decline.
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Crime
Murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, robbery, burglary,
larceny, auto theft and arson rates are likely to decline between 1986
and 1995 and then level off near their 1990 levels after the turn of
the century. This reflects the changes in the population of young
males who tend to commit most of these crimes. Males ages 15 to
24, for example, are arrested for these crimes five times more often
than are women or older men. The rates for these crimes, therefor,
are likely to mirror the changes in the 15 to 24 year old male
population.
A low point in the adolescent male population is projected
for the period between 1995 and 2000, with a decline by about 15
percent from the 1986 level, but half of that loss is projected to be
regained after the turn of the century when the baby boomlet
reaches its mid teens and early twenties. About 8,000 fewer young Fi9ure ^9
males are projected for the year 2010.

A steep decline In the number of
young males will bottom out in
the mid-1990s and stabilize after
the turn of the century. Crime is
likely to fall with this specialized
population and to remain some
what lower than the present rates
well into the 21st Century.
Source: U.S. Census
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SECTION 2

CONSUMER MARKETS

Age and the preoccupations of people at different stages of

Maine Household
and Family Incomes

the life cycle shape decisions made throughout the economy —

1980 Dollars per Household
Elderly Singles

decisions that range from the kinds and numbers of goods that are

Young Singles
Mid-age Singles

produced to the types and locations of stores and service businesses

Single Parents

that populate downtowns and suburban shopping malls across the

Elderly Couples

country. The exceptionally large size o f the baby boom generation

Young Families
School Families

has been a major influence on the shape of consumer markets for

Grown Families
Couples No Kids
0

10000 20000 30000 40000
1980

2005

more than 40 years as the group has passed from infancy to middle
age. Through the remainder of this generation’s lifetime, it can be
expected to remain a dominant feature of the landscape of consump

Figure 50
The presence of a second earner
or a second pension in a house
hold is probably reflected in the
income advantage held by Maine
couples over Maine singles of all
ages.

tion.
Other changes in the age structure of Maine society will
similarly influence the pattern of spending and consumption that
accounts for about two-thirds of all economic activity in the state.
This influence is exerted through the role of age in determining the

Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

nine household types, each of which tends to conform, on average,
to a characteristic consumption profile.
Different types of households tend to divide their budgets in
different ways, depending on their age and relative level of health,
their marital status and whether there are children present, and on
the ages of those children. Thus, elderly households will tend to
spend a greater share of their incomes on prescription drugs and
medical care; families with teenage children will tend to spend more
on food; young single people will tend to spend more on recreation.
Household incomes, as well, tend to vary with family type,
with the youngest and oldest householders tending to earn the
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lowest incomes (reflecting career-entry wage levels in the first
instance and pension levels in the other) and middle age couples
tending to earn the highest incomes (reflecting longer experience in
the workforce and the greater likelihood that two earners are
present).
Because these central tendencies in household, income and

Major Items in
The Household Budget

consumption patterns have been well defined, and because the size
and age structure of the population can be reliably projected, a broad
view of consumer markets in the early years of the 21 st Century can
be constructed to suggest areas of emerging growth and decline; of

Percent of 1980 Budgets
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Elderly Couples
Grown Families
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threat and opportunity for the Maine economy. Our model of

Young Singles

household consumption is based on national trends in household

Couples No Kids

spending patterns, adjusted to reflect Maine trends in population,

Mid-age Singles

households, income levels and economic growth.
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household budgets spent in major consumption categories, dollar
spending per household and total value of household spending are Figure 51
all considered in the analysis

Maine people spend three quar
ters or more of their household
Nine household types and eight broad areas of consumer budgets on just three items —
Food, Housing and Transporta
spending are considered. Three of the spending areas — Housing, tion.

Transportation and Health — hold important implications for the
future demand for public services and receive additional considera
tion in the following section. The five remaining spending areas —
Food, Clothing and Personal Care, Education, Communication
and Personal Business and Recreation — are discussed in this
section.
For all types of households, food, housing and transporta
tion absorb between three quarters and four fifths of all household
spending, with housing costs representing the largest single spend
ing item — between one quarter and two fifths of the household
budget. Middle Age Singles and Couples with preschool children
spend the largest shares of their budgets on these three necessities
— 79 percent — followed by Couples with no children., 77
percent. Single Elderly households spend the smallest share in the
three combined categories, 73 percent, but the largest share on
housing at 40 percent o f their household budgets.
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

Different consumer choices and income pressures, how
ever, are reflected in these spending patterns.
Middle Age Singles, for example, have the third-lowest
average incomes of all household types in Maine, probably reflect
ing the disadvantage to households with only one income in the

Major Items In
The Household Budget

present economy. The high relative cost of necessities to these

Percent o f 2005 Budget

households is likely to reflect severe financial limits on their
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freedom to choose in the marketplace. The dollar spending levels
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by these households suggests that they place a premium on housing
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quality, since they spend more on housing than do other household

Young Singles
Couples No Kids

types in their income range, and make up for that premium by

Mid-age Singles

purchasing economy-model cars, since they spend the second

Young Families
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lowest amount on transportation. Their somewhat high per capita

Housing

spending on food suggests that they may eat out more often than
other household types.

Figure 52
Maine families in the future are
iikely to find little more flexibility
in their household budgets than
do Mainers today, as housing,
transportation and energy prices
rise to absorb a constant portion
of future income gains.
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecasting and Simulation Model; Office of
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Couples with preschool children, on the other hand, tend to
have hjgher than average incomes but also require higher-cost
&

&

m

&

family housing. The age of their children suggests that these are
among the youngest families in Maine and are likely to have
purchased homes in the high-priced real estate markets of the 1980s.
Families with preschoolers spend the second-highest share of their
budgets on housing, the same as Middle Age Singles, but they spend
nearly twice as many dollars — second only to Couples with no
children,

M aine’s highest income households.

These young

families appear to afford their high housing costs by cutting back on
food and transportation expenditures — spending in both catego
ries the lowest shares and the fewest dollars of all couples.
Spending on necessities is projected to decline relative to
total household spending, dropping to between two thirds and three
quarters of consumer budgets by the year 2005. Virtually all of this
decline will be accounted for by food prices, which are projected to
increase more slowly than household incomes. Housing and trans
portation costs are expected to keep pace with rising incomes,
suggesting that little relief is in store for consumers already coping
with historically high prices for homes, cars and energy. Neverthe58

less, a reduction in overall spending on necessities will allow for
more discretionary spending by consumers — much of which is
expected to be absorbed by health care and recreation.

Food

Average Household
Spending on Food
1980 Dollars

Spending on food absorbed between one fifth and one

Elderly Singles

quarter of household budgets in 1980 and is projected to decrease by

Mid-age Singles

2005 to between one sixth and one fifth. Elderly Couples and Single
Parents

spend the largest portions of their incomes on food;

Couples with preschool children and Couples with no children
spend the smallest shares. Elderly Singles spend the fewest dollars
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on food, while Couples with grown children spend the most. —
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over $100 a week in 1980 rising to about $140 in the coming
century.

Household food consumption circulated nearly $ 1.4-

billion through Maine’s economy in 1980 and will rise to nearly

Figure 53

$2.6-billion after the turn of the century.

The dollar cost of food is likely to
rise through the coming decades,
but not as rapidly as household
Incomes.

Housing

Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

Housing is the largest component of spending for all types
of households, absorbing between one quarter and two fifths of
household budgets. Elderly Couples spend the smallest part of their
budgets on housing — about a quarter, followed closely by Couples
with grown children.. These groups are among M aine’s oldest
families, who were likely to have purchased their first homes before
the period of rapid price increases.

Single people and young

families bear the greatest relative burden of housing costs and many
of these households share a high probability of being renters.
At the bottom of the housing market, young single people
pay average market rents of about $380 a month, which take one
third of their incomes. Below these market rates, single parents also
pay out one third of their income for housing but the availability of
rental assistance to these families reduces the average monthly cost
to about $260. High spending on housing rises to about $850 a
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month for Couples with no children, who commit nearly two fifths
of their budgets to cover housing costs.. These costs are projected
to rise by about one fifth through the next fifteen years. Total
spending on housing by households was nearly $2-billion in 1980
in Maine and is projected to rise to more than $4.6-billion in 2005.
Average Household
Spending on Housing
1980 Dollars

Transportation

Single Parents
Young Singles
Elderly Singles

Transportation absorbed just about the same share of house
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hold spending in 1980 as did food, ranging from just over a tenth of
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all spending by Elderly Singles to a high of more than a quarter of
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the budgets of Couples with grown children and Couples with no
children. Transportation will become relatively more expensive

2005

than food in the next century, because food is projected to become
Figure 54

relatively cheaper, while relative transportation costs are projected
to remain constant. For most other household types, transportation

Housing costs are projected to
rise with incomes, pushing
annual mortgage payments to
extraordinary levels
Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecasting and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

requires about one fifth of their budgets. At the high end of the
transportation spending pattern, the greater mobility and personal
freedom afforded to older teen agers and young adults in the
household is likely to be reflected in the budgets of Couples with
grown children.. The prevalence of two-earner, two-commuter
families and higher-value cars among Couples with no children is
likely to be reflected in the high transportation spending by these
households.
Elderly Singles spend the fewest dollars on transportation
— just over $900 in 1980 — while Couples with grown children.
spent more than $5,800 in that year.

Transportation costs are

projected to rise by three quarters of their 1980 levels by the year
2005. Transportation spending accounted for nearly $1.4-billion in
M aine’s 1980 economy and is projected to exceed $3.2-billion after
the turn of the century.

Health
Household spending in the health category includes costs
incurred both for direct health care and for preventative spending on
60

physical fitness. Health costs are projected to be the fastest-growing
consumer expense through the next two decades. Health spending
is the most strongly influenced by age, with both types of elderly
households spending more than a tenth of their budgets on health in
1980, while no other household type spent more than one twentieth.
Health costs are projected to consume between one fifth and one

Average Household
Spending on Health

sixth of elderly incomes within the next two decades. Young Singles
spend the least on health of all households. Total Health spending
in 1980 was estimated at more than $320-million and is projected to

1980 Doll are
Young Singles
MidAge Singles
Single Parents
Young Families

rise to more than $1.1-billion by 2005.
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Spending on education reflects most strongly the presence
of school age children in the household and especially the presence Figure 55
of college age young adults. Elderly Singles spend less than one
Rapidly rising health costs are

percent of their budgets on education, while Couples with grown likely to become more significant
children spend more than three percent. Young Singles also spend in every segment of society but
especially among elderly house

about three percent of their budgets on education. Education costs holds.
are projected to fall by about one fifth through the next fifteen years.
Total education spending by all households was more than $101million in 1980 and is projected to exceed $186-million by 2005.

Clothing and Personal Care
Clothing and Personal Care expenditures are most signifi
cant in the budgets of households where young adults are present,
but Single Parents commit the highest portions of their budgets to
clothing expenses — more than eight percent. The lowest portions
are spent by Elderly Singles at just under six percent. Clothing and
personal care expenses are expected to fall relative to total spending
to between about five and seven percent of average household
budgets. Dollars spent in this category volume are highest among
families with children, which typically spent more than $1,000 a
year in 1980. Dollar spending is projected to rise to between $1,500
and $2,500 by families with children after the turn of the century.
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

Total spending on Clothing and Personal Care in 1980 was above
$450-million and is projected to rise above $840-million by 2005.

Communication and Personal Business
Average Household
Spending on Communication
1980 Dollars

Spending on communication and personal business —
which includes telephone and correspondence costs as well as
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professional fees charged by bankers, brokers, lawyers, insurance
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agents and funeral directors — absorbs the smallest shares of
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household budgets among couples with children and the largest
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shares among Elderly Singles, who spend more than five percent of
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their budgets in this category.
considerably by 2005,

Spending is projected to rise

to between four and seven percent of

household costs. Couples without children spend the highest dollar
Figure 56

levels most on communication and personal business — over $700
in 1980 and nearly $ 1,800 after the turn of the century — followed

Communication is a relatively
small spending item for the
average household but both the
cost and the amount purchased
are projected to rise in the future.
The Communiation category also
includes various items of per
sonal business, such as legal
fees.
Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

closely by Couples with grown children. Total household spending
in 1980 was estimated to be more than $200-million and is projected
to approach $675-million by 2005.

Recreation
Spending on recreation — which includes expenditures for
lodging and recreational vehicles, media and sporting events, gar
dening supplies and sports equipment, travel and toys, and for
cultural, fraternal and religious activities — represents an impor
tant and increasing part of household budgets, except for Elderly
Singles, who spend only about three percent of their budgets in this
category. Couples with school age children devote the largest
portions of their household spending to recreation — eight percent
in 1980 — followed by Young Singles at just over seven percent.
Single Parents, Elderly Couples and Middle Age Singles spend
relatively small portions of their budgets on recreation; Couples
with school age children are expected to increase recreational
spending to a tenth of their budgets in the coming century. Other
than the necessities — food, housing and transportation — recrea62

tional spending will absorb the largest single share of spending by
non-elderly households in the year 2005.
Couples under age 65 spent more than $ 1,000 on recreation
in 1980 and are projected to increase this spending to between
$2,000 and $3,600 in the coming decades. Families with school age

Average Household
Spending on Recreation

children are expected to be the high spenders in the next century.
Young Singles are likely to be the highest per capita spenders on
recreation — about $700 in 1980 and up to $1,500 after the turn of
the century. Total household spending on recreation was above
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$400-million in 1980 and is projected to climb to nearly $ 1.2-billion
in 2005 — an increase second only to that projected for health
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spending through the period.
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Figure 57
Households are projected to
commit more dollars and larger
proportions of their budgets to
recreation in the future. Families
with children are likely to spend
the largest amounts in general
but single people and childless
couples will tend to have high per
capita recreational spending.
Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment
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SECTION 3

DEMAND FOR SERVICES

Total Household
Spending on Health
Billions o f 1980 Dollars

In addition to affecting consumer markets in the future, the
changing age structure of the Maine population is likely to have a
substantial impact on the pattern and priorities of government
spending on basic services. While our study can offer little in the
way of specific guidance to strategic budget planners in state
government, key demographic trends can suggest emerging broad
areas of pressure that will repay early attention.

1980

2005

Figure 58
The aging population together
with rising costs of health care
and insurance are projected to
triple total health spending in
Maine after the turn of the cen
tury.

Sickness and Infirmity
As a birth cohort ages, an increasing proportion of its
members suffers illness and with increasing frequency. The age
group 65 and older suffers particularly high rates of illness. Persons
age 45 to 64 spend an average 1.3 days per year in hospitals. Persons

Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

65 and older spend an average of 3.8 days. Chronic illness limits the
activities of 25 percent of the cohort 45 to 64 and 41 percent of the
cohort 65 and older.
Persons under age 65 spend three percent of their income for
medical care. Persons 65 and older spend 10 percent. By the early
years of the 21st Century, elderly health care spending may rise to
20 percent of income. Elderly households spent between $1,100
and $ 1,400 on average for health care expenses in 1980 and are pro
jected to spend between $2,800 and $3,600 per household within
two decades. Maine’s total health care bill is projected to be two
and one half times higher in the year 2005 than it was in 1980,
accounting for more than $1.1-billion of private spending.
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The number of persons 65 and older will have a substantial
effect on the prevalence of illness in Maine society and on the need
for, and expenditures on, medical care. The population 65 and older
is projected to increase by 10 percent between 1986 to 1995 and then
to remain constant for a decade until 2005.

After 2005, the

population over age 65 will begin to increase again and this increase
can be expected to accelerate after 2011 when the oldest baby

The Maine Population
85 Years Old and Older
Projections to 2010

boomers turn 65. During the quarter century between 1986 and
2010, the comparatively slow growth in the over 65 population
suggests that the aging of the Maine population will have only a
moderate effect on the prevalence of illness and medical care
expenditures.
The very old frequently need professional nursing care.
This is reflected in the proportion of people living in nursing homes
and homes for the aged. While only four percent of Maine people Figure 59
65 and older were living in these institutional settings in 1980, 26

The population 85 years old and

percent of those age 85 and older were living in residential care older is projected to nearly
facilities. The latter number, moreover, does not include those double in 20 years and to in

crease from 1 percent to 2 per

living at home who required frequent visits by nurses and other cent of the Maine population.
medical professionals. The number of persons in the population age This group is the most likely of all
Maine people to need both critical

85 and older, therefore, is an indicator of the prevalence in society and long term health care.
of long term illnesses and infirmities requiring frequent treatment
and assistance.
The population 85 and older is projected to nearly double
between 1986 and 2010, increasing by 15,000 persons, from 17,000
at the beginning of the period to 32,000 at the close. Persons 85 and
older made up 1 percent of the 1986 population of Maine; they will
account for two percent in 2010. This suggests that the number of
people in Maine society requiring frequent, often daily, medical
treatment will increase sharply over the coming quarter century.

Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Alcohol and drug abuse are likely to decline from 1986 to
2000 and then increase again through 2010. This pattern reflects
J

65

Source: U.S. Census

projected changes in the population most likely to abuse drugs and
alcohol — males between the ages of 18 and 29. Males in this age
range, for example, are two and a half times more likely than women
and older men to be arrested for drug use, drunkenness and drunk
driving. However, whether arrest rates reflect abuse rates remains
an open question. Young males may also be more public than other
groups in their drug and alcohol use or may display other lifestyle
attributes that raise the likelihood of arrest. Similarly, the possibil
ity that alcohol and prescription drug abuse among the elderly,
suggested in some recent national research, may become more
prominent in an aging population must also be left open for
consideration. The 18 to 29 year old male population is projected
to fall through the turn of the century to about seven percent of the
total population, followed by a return to an eight percent share in
2010 when there will be about 15,000 fewer males in this age group
than in 1986.
Figure 60
A decrease in substance abuse
through the rest of the century is
projected on the basis of declin
ing numbers of young adult men.
This group is more likely to be
arrested for substance abuse
than the rest of the Maine popula
tion.
Source: U.S. Census

Housing
Changes in the housing market through the past two decades
have left some Maine families at a severe disadvantage, while other
Maine families have received the principal benefits of rising prices
and the changing construction mix. Only about 50,000 of the state’s
estimated 450,000 households have been able to hold their housing
costs to the traditional standard of one quarter of income. For more
than 200,000 Maine families, housing now requires nearly one third
of their incomes. And for another 100,000 to 150,000 of Maine’s
youngest or poorest families, housing costs are at or nearing 40
percent of the budgets they have to spend.
Housing assistance is already the top spending priority for
one in eight Mainers between the ages of 18 and 34 and for one in
five of those over age 65. About two in five Maine people of all ages
would like to see more public spending on housing assistance, but
about the same number would like to see spending remain where it
is today. Fewer than one in ten of all Mainers place housing
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assistance at the top of their spending priorities, including only three
in 100 of the politically important baby boomers. Nearly one in ten
would like to see housing assistance reduced. The problem facing
policy makers in the future, therefore, will encompass both tight
targeting and restricted program design. Maine can neither afford
to ignore the burden of housing affordability on those who need
assistance, nor to undercut the political will to ease that burden with

Total Household
Spending on Housing
Billions of 1980 Dollars

overly-broad or excessively costly programs.

Transportation
Transportation is a necessity in a large, rural state like Maine
1980

2005

and the increasing cost of energy and vehicles since the 1970s has
pushed transportation spending to become a relatively large part of Figure 61
the average household budget — about a fifth on average for most

Total spending on housing is

Maine families. At the low end of transportation spending, single projected to remain at nearly one
parents and single elderly people appear to attempt to control their third of all consumption in Maine,
rising by more than $2-billion in

transportation costs by relying on public transportation, by the the coming decades. Without
conscious limitation of unnecessary travel and by the purchase of public intervention, affordable
housing is likely to remain a

older cars.

These lifestyle choices suggest that future public problem.

transportation budgets and inevitable restrictions on vehicular air
emissions are likely to place these two types of households at
substantial risk of limited mobility beyond the urban centers of the
state.
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Forecast
ing and Simulation Model; Office of
Technology Assessment

SECTION 4

CIVIC LIFE

Organizations' Share
of Household Time
Hours per Week

Participation in politics, community affairs, religion and in
civic and social associations are all likely to increase through the
coming quarter century. While this will make public life more
vibrant, it will also increase levels of dissension and disagreement
as more people become active in their communities.

Elected

officials and community leaders are likely to find it more difficult
to obtain agreement on policies and decisions.
The projected increase in public participation will result
1975

1985

from the aging of the population. Older adults are more active in
Figure 62

civic life that are younger ones. Three quarters of Americans over
age 35, but only half of those between 18 and 34, registered to vote

The eroding amount of free time
available to Americans has
resulted in a trend toward reduc
ing commitments to voluntary
and public service organizations.

in 1986. Americans over age 35 gave an average $750 (or three
percent of income) to charity in 1984. Adults under age 35 gave
only $400 (or 1.5 percent of income). The population age 35 and
older is projected to increase by more than 200,000 persons between

Source: Office of Technology Assess
ment

1986 and 2010, climbing 11 percent in proportionate share of the
total population.

Voluntarism
Voluntary participation represents a key dimension of public
life in Maine, where state government relies heavily on a citizen
Legislature, citizen advisory boards and regulatory panels, where
town governments tap local volunteers for essential planning and
decision-making functions and where community life, especially in
rural areas, depends on public-spirited individuals for services and
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amenities that would otherwise lie beyond financial reach. But with
far-reaching structural changes already underway in Maine’s popu
lation, economy and patterns of settlement, the role of voluntarism
in the state’s future is likewise subject to considerable change.
Advancing urbanization and expanding prosperity are bring

Volunteers in
Maine's Regions

ing a faster pace and greater complexity to life in Maine and each of

Percent of Regional Population

these forces for change is placing increased pressure on the critical
voluntary resource — time.
Long distance commuting, two-earner family structures and
the continuing expansion of cultural and recreational opportunities
in the state combine to erode the free time available to even the most

35 ---------1---------r -

public spirited of citizens, limiting the time available for voluntary

Regions

South

I---------1--------- 1

North MidcoasDowncast W est

Central

— Maine

contributions to their communities. An explosion in small business
entrepreneurship in the 1980s has contributed vitality to M aine’s Figure 63
economy but at the risk of undercutting the vitality of Maine com

More than half of Maine adults

munities, as entrepreneurs find the long hours and extended work volunteer their time without pay
weeks demanded by young and growing businesses in the pool of to help others. Volunteer service
is particularly strong in Southern

hours that might have been devoted to public service on school or Maine and in Aroostook County.
planning boards, as Little League coaches or Scout leaders, as
church supper organizers or fire and rescue volunteers.
Even when the time for service to others is available,
Maine’s volunteers may find the productivity of that time severely
challenged by the complexity of the decisions they are asked to
make as the costs of poor decisions and missed opportunities rise,
as the competing interests with stakes in those decisions become
more numerous and less compatible, and as the technical dimen
sions of those decisions tap expanding information resources and
demand increasing study and expertise.
Not only the volume of development applications, for ex
ample, but also the difficulty of evaluating those applications as
they impact on traffic patterns, water quality, wildlife habitat, air
emissions, waste capacity, visual and recreational quality, school
enrollments, housing affordability and local property taxes, each
combine to drive planning boards into midnight sessions and
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Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

communities to development moratoriums.

Even as the time

available to volunteer at all becomes scarce, the time demanded of
those who do volunteer in increasing.
Nationally, changing patterns of time use reflect a broad
decrease in the time available to Americans for non-working
activities. In only a handful of these activities has the commitment
of time increased since the 1970s.

Even time spent watching

television has slipped by nearly three-quarters of an hour per week,
while the time devoted to organizational activities has fallen by 21
percent.
Despite the decrease in available time, M aine’s voluntary
sector remains healthy, and the characteristics of present day
volunteers suggest that voluntary service will increase, rather than
decrease in the future. More than half of the Maine people polled
Volunteering is strongly related
to education, rising with the level
of schooling. But high school
graduates make up just over half
of all volunteers in Maine

— actual work helping others, outside the family and without pay

Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

among the groups least likely to volunteer, 30 to 40 percent are

by the Commission said they had personally done volunteer work
— during 1988.

Among the groups most likely to volunteer,

participation rates can reach 60 and even 70 percent. And even
nevertheless active in service to others.
Maine’s volunteers appear to recognize an obligation to
return to their communities something of what they have them
selves received. Education, for example, is the paradigmatic public
good, made universally available by the community and almost im
possible to acquire without the assistance and cooperation of others.
Thus, voluntarism in Maine rises with the level of education and
those who have received the most from society tend to give the most
back in return. Half of the state’s high school graduates perform
volunteer work, as do two in three of those who have attended
college and nearly three in four of those who graduated from
college.
But even among those with the least education, more than
one in four volunteer to help others and more than half of all
volunteers in Maine have a 12th grade education or less. Among this
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slight majority of volunteers with no more than a high school
education, income tends to be the driving characteristic of voluntary
activity as, again, those who have gained the most from their
communities return the most in service. Among those with no more
than a high school education, one in three earning less than $10,000
a year volunteer while one in two of those earning $30,000 or more
volunteer. Thus, the pattern of those who have received the most

Incomes of Maine
Volunteers

tending to return the most is again evident.
Curiously, the relationship between income and volun
tarism does not affect the service rates of those who have attended
or graduated from college, where high rates of volunteering occur
regardless of income levels but where those rates do not rise with
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incomes.

Income Groups

— Maine

Differences between educational groups are also evident in Figure 65
a comparison of the regional pattern of voluntarism around Maine. Volunteering also appears to be
strongly related to household
income but, because income
Volunteer rates approach 60 percent in Aroostook County levels tend to rise with education
and in Southern Maine and fall to between 40 and 50 percent in levels, education appears to be
the factor the best explains
Central and Western Maine. But among those who have attended volunteering.

or graduated from college, these regional differences disappear and
those with the highest levels of education, regardless of where they
live, tend to volunteer at the same high rate. Among those with no
more than a high school education, however, regional differences
are intensified. In Southern Maine and Aroostook County, between
50 and 55 percent of persons with up to a 12th grade education
volunteer while only 30 to 40 percent of this educational group
volunteer in Central and Western Maine.
In a number of cases, education also appears to be the
driving force behind apparent relationships between voluntarism
and other demographic characteristics. Inmigrants, for example,
tend to be much more likely to volunteer than native Mainers, and
this relationship appears to change smoothly with the length of
residency in Maine. Thus, 68.2 percent of the most recent inmi
grants say they volunteer, compared with 59.5 percent of the longerterm inmigrants, 52.7 percent of Mainers who moved out of state
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Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

and later returned, and 48.4 percent of lifelong Mainers. Hidden in
this pattern, however, is the tendency of inmigrants to be more
highly educated than Maine natives, and for the newest inmigrants
to be the most highly educated of all. Controlled for education, the
relationship disappears.
Similarly misleading patterns occur in connection with
income and with property ownership. Renters appear to be the least
likely and landowners the most likely to volunteer; persons with
$20,000 or lower incomes appear to be the least likely and persons
with $30,000 or higher incomes the most likely to volunteer. But
when the relationship between high education and high incomes
and property ownership is taken into account, neither income nor
property tends to be related to voluntarism; instead, education
appears to explain the tendency to volunteer.
Volunteering appears to decline
with age after rising from the low
levels of young adulthood but the
real explanation may be the
concentration of children in
households headed by 25 to 44
year old and the higher education
levels of this age group.

The relationship between voluntarism and age presents the
most complex pattern of interacting forces. Here, age, education
and the presence of children in the household all interact to generate
high rates of voluntary service — nearly four in five — among
highly educated parents, while neither children nor age define a
pattern for those with no more than a high school education.

Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

Voluntarism, then, appears to be most strongly related to
education and educational levels are rising in Maine as baby
boomers age and as inmigrants continue to arrive and as the genera
tions under age 25 exceed the educational attainment rates of
previous generations. Despite the pressures of time and complex
ity, therefore, the future of public service in Maine is likely to be
positive by this broadest of indicators.
But among the most educated Mainers, the presence of
children in the household tends to push volunteer rates to near 80
percent and the absence of children tends drive volunteer rates to
near 60 percent. The trend toward fewer children in the society of
the future

— based on the smaller numbers of young adults

available for parenthood — would suggest a dampening of the rate
of voluntarism may be possible in the future.
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Citizen Participation
A second dimension of public life in Maine is participation
in the political process. Voting represents the fundamental political
act in the American system, and presidential elections tend to draw
the greatest numbers of voters to the polls nationwide. National

Maine Presidential
Election Turnouts

estimates of voter turnout in the presidential elections of the 1980s
average around 53 percent of voting age adults, while in Maine the

(%)

Population and Participation

(000)

three presidential elections of the decade have drawn an average 65
percent of the age-eligible population — an average that has been
fairly consistent through more than three decades.
In its polling, the Commission took a broader view of
political participation as including voting in federal, state or local
elections, attending local government meetings, membership in

1956
C3 Rate

politically-interested organizations and correspondence with news

1964

1972
M

1980

Voting
Age

0

1988
Turnout

papers or elected officials. Like the political process itself, polling Figure 67
on public policy questions tends to miss nonparticipators — nearly
Maine’s voter participation rates

a fifth of those contacted refused to participate in the poll — and the have been relatively steady in
findings consequently tend to overstate the level of public activism recent history around 65 percent
in the Maine population. Nevertheless, the results do provide a
useful perspective on those who do participate — who they are,
where they live, what demographic characteristics they have in
common.
In contrast to the better than 60 percent turnout of all voters
measured in any single presidential election, more than 80 percent
of the “participators” captured in the Commission’s polling said
they voted in at least one election— federal, state or local — during
the previous year.

The source of this distinction — whether

characteristic of the sample itself or a result of the more plentiful
opportunities to vote allowed by the phrasing of the question — is
less important than dominance of voting in the hierarchy of political
acts, even among the more activist population that responded to the
poll.
While four in five respondents said they voted, only about
one in two physically attended a local government meeting, one in
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of voting age adults.
Source: U.S. Census

three belongs to a politically-interested organization and only one
in five expressed their opinions publicly through letters to the editor
or to elected officials.
Taking all four forms of political activity together, the poll
found that 10 percent of Mainers sampled do not participate in the
process at all, 40 percent engage in only one of the activities and
nearly 75 percent engage in no more than two political activities
during the course of a year. Nearly twenty percent of the sample
participated in three of the political activities defined in the poll and
seven percent participated in all four. On average across the entire
sample, Mainers participate in 1.8 of the four activities — voting,
attending local meetings, belonging to politically-interested organi
zations and corresponding with newspapers or elected officials.
Figure 68
When asked if they voted in a
federal, state or local Election-,
attended a M eetin g of their local
government; paid Membership
dues to a group that takes stands
on issues; or wrote a L e tte r to a
newspaper or elected official,
four in five of our sample did the
first, but only one in five did the
last.
Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

Like voluntarism, political participation is strongly influ
enced by education, with the most highly educated Mainers tending
to participate in twice as many activities as do the least educated —
2.5 activities per college graduate vs. 1.2 activities per person with
less than a 12th grade education. But unlike voluntarism, political
participation is also influenced by other demographic characteris
tics independent of education, as well.
Income levels and property ownership are among the most
strongly related of these characteristics to political participation,
with property owners and those with the highest incomes between
a third and a half more active than renters and those with the lowest
incomes. In contrast to the case of voluntarism, in which volunteers
were disproportionately the parents of children in the household,
political activity tends to be related to households that contain more
than one adult — whether or not children are present as well. Yet
political participation is also strongly related to voluntarism itself,
with volunteers about a third more active than non-volunteers.
Age is also related to the degree of political participation,
most strongly in the tendency of the youngest adults — those 18 to
24— to have low levels of participation. Political activity then rises
with age to a peak in the 45-64 year old age group and then drops
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back slightly among the elderly to the same level as among those 25
to 44.
Political participation is related to other demographic char
acteristics as well, but the relationships are more complex and
involve educational levels as well as the individual characteristics.
Thus, among those with no more than a high school education,

Education and
Citizen Participation
Average Number of

participation is higher in small rural towns of less than 5000
population than it is in the cities and suburbs of metropolitan areas.
Among those with higher educational levels, participation rates
tend to be the same regardless of the size of the town in which they
live. A similar relationship exists between participation and gender,
where women with lower levels of education tend to be less active
than men with lower educational levels, but both men and women

School
Education
Group

College

Grad

— Maine

with higher educational levels tend to participate with the same
degree of activism. Apparent differences between regional partici

Age and Citizen
Participation

pation rates and between natives and inmigrants are also explained

Average Number of

by the educational differences between these groups, with higher
participation rates in coastal regions and among inmigrants disap
pearing when education level is controlled.
As is the case with voluntarism, the prospects for increasing
levels of political participation appear to be strong in the context of

Age Group

— Maine

the demographic trends shaping Maine’s future. Rising incomes
and increasing levels of education would bring more Mainers into
the demographic groups most likely to be politically active. The Figure 69
middle-aging of the population will place the largest number of In the four public activities
Mainers in the 45 to 64 year old age group that is the most politically measured in our poll, participa
tion rises with education levels

active, while the severe decline in the 18 to 24 year old age group — college graduates participate
that will prove so disruptive to labor markets will also drain in an average of two to three of
the activities; people with less

population from the least politically active segment of the overall than 12 years of schooling
participate in just over one.
Maine people over age 24 tend to
participate in nearly 2 of the four
public activities measured on
average, with only a small vari
ation in participation levels after
age 25.

population.

Source: Northeast Research, Inc.
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SECTION 5

THE LABOR POOL

Economic growth in the 1980s has changed Maine from a

The Labor Pool
and The Workforce
(000)

labor surplus area to one of tight labor markets and rising wages.

Inmigration Scenario

While pockets of high unemployment have persisted in some of the
more isolated, rural parts of the state, the problem of finding enough
workers to fill the available jobs has replaced — at least for a time
— the state’s historic preoccupation with ensuring the creation of
enough jobs to employ the available workforce.
1990
E9 Adults

1995
H

2000
Prime
Pool

2005
Q

2010

Labor
Force

Whether this

reversal of the historic pattern will continue into the future is
uncertain and will depend on the interaction of economic, demo
graphic, technological and behavioral trends that will determine

Figure 70
Maine’s labor supply Is drawn
from the population of all adults
over age 15. Its prime labor pool,
however, is the smaller popula
tion between the ages of high
school graduation and retirement.
Both of these populations are
projected to increase in the
future, as is the labor force — the
proportion of all adults ready and
willing to work. Despite this
growth, the number of jobs in
Maine's economy has the poten
tial to grow even faster.

both the supply of and the demand for labor.

Labor Supply
M aine’s prime labor pool — the population of the state
between the ages of 18 and 64 — is projected to increase by
seventeen percent between 1986 and 2010, rising from 714,000
persons to 838,000. Under the assumption of constant inmigration,
the prime labor pool would increase by nearly 19 percent to 849,000
persons. How many of these potential workers actually participate

Source: U.S. Census; Maine Simula
tion and Forecasting Model

in the labor market, however, will be a matter of personal choice.
During the past twenty years, women have entered the labor
force in unprecedented numbers. In 1970, two fifths o f adult women
were in the labor force, while by 1985 that number was more than
half.

Seven in ten adult women under age 65 polled by the

Commission were in the labor force in 1988; among women over
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age 65, more than one sixth continued to be active in the workforce.
More than seven working women in ten work full time, and nearly
eight in ten of those under age 65. These findings suggest that the
labor force participation rate for all adult women has continued to
increase at the rapid pace set in the early 1980s and may be nearing
60 percent.

Maine's Labor Force
Participation Rate
Percent of Adults 16+

At the same time that women have been moving into the
labor force, an unprecedented proportion of men have opted for
early retirement. Our polling identified nearly one man in five
between the ages of 50 and 64 to be retired and out of the workforce
in 1988 and the Census Bureau’s annual population survey reached
a similar conclusion in 1987. Only three quarters of the men in this
age group work, while an extraordinary 97 percent of those 35-49
do so, and nearly 90 percent of those 18-34. Among men over age
65, one in ten continue to work full time and one in six keep active Figure 71
with part-time work.

Mainers have been quite active in
the labor force during the 1980s
and the state's participation has
The prosperous economic conditions of the late 1980s reached historic highs in the
appear to have had a strong influence on the choices Maine people prosperous middle and late years
of the decade.

have made about working. The movement of women into the labor
market appears to have accelerated since 1985 to the fastest rate
since W orld War Two. The return of the elderly to the workforce
in the late 1980s appears to have reversed a precipitous 25-year
decline and returned the participation rate of those over 65 to the
1960 level. The overall participation rate of all adults over 18 in the
labor force appears also to have accelerated in 1988, even from the
rising trend established between 1985 and 1987.
Plentiful jobs, rising wages and incomes appear to be
drawing Maine people into the workforce at an unprecedented rate,
but Maine continues to have the smallest proportion of its popula
tion in the labor force of all the New England states. Since the mid1980s, however, the improvement in M aine’s participation rate has
been double that of the rest of the region and second only to Vermont
among the New England states.
Recent workforce improvements, however, are almost wholly
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Dept, of
Labor; Northeast Research, Inc.

accounted for by the increasing numbers of working women in the
state, and, to a lesser extent, by the return of elderly people to the job
market for the first time in a quarter century. W omen’s participation
has improved by up to ten percent in the late 1980s and elderly
participation has doubled. The participation of Maine men in the job
market in almost unchanged at about three in four. By considering

Women in the
Maine Workforce

the different participation rates for Maine men and women at differ

Percent of Women 16+-

ent stages of the life cycle, emerging limits are suggested for
M aine’s labor supply
Among adults between the ages of 18 to 34, for example,
four in five are already working. At the lower end of this age group,
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post-secondary education is a common preoccupation and one that
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is likely to only increase with time. Nearly one person in five in this

1988

age group is, in fact, a full time student. For women, this is the age
Figure 72
Most of the improvement in
Maine's labor force participation
rate during the prosperity of the
middle 1980s has resulted from
the continuing strong movement
of women into the workforce.
Source: U.S. Census; Maine Dept, of
Labor; Northeast Research, Inc.

of child bearing and child care. Yet seven women in ten of this age
are already in the workforce, another one in ten is a student, and only
about one in five is a full-time homemaker. Among men of this age,
nine in ten are already in the workforce, and nearly eight of the
remaining ten percent are in school full time. W hether the relative
handful of full time students and homemakers in this group,who
remain out of the work force by obvious and understandable choice,
can be enticed to work at any wage is questionable.
Among adults between 35 and 50 years old, nearly nine in
ten are already at work, including virtually all of the men and four
in five of the women. The younger half of this group includes the
oldest and largest part of the baby boom, whose female members
have been a driving force behind the trend toward rising numbers of
women in the labor force. As more baby boomers age into this group
and as the World War II generation passes age 50, it is likely that
the one woman in six, who describes herself as a full time home
maker, will decline. Yet even allowing for this possibility, so few
persons in this age group remain out of the workforce that the
resulting additions to the supply of labor are likely to be small.
Among persons over age 65, one in five continue to be active
in the labor market, including twenty five percent of the men and
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sixteen percent o f the women. This cohort breaks into two sub
groups, those between 65 and 74 years old and those over 75. Only
the younger of these subgroups holds any real prospect for increased
participation in the labor force, but it is the older of the two groups
that will be growing through the next twenty years. The population
65-74 will remain nearly flat or decline slightly through fifteen of
those twenty years and will begin a period acceleration only after

Workforce Participation
in New England
Percent of Adults 16+

2005. It is likely that most of the working population over age 65

Maine

are among this younger group, which would, therefore, result in a

Rhode Island

participation rate of more than one in three for persons 65-74.
Whether a significant share of the remaining 60,000 full time
retirees in this age group can be enticed back into the labor market

Massachusetts
NewEngland
Vermont
Connecticut
N.Hampshire

after a lifetime of work will be an important determinant of the
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future size of the workforce.
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The only clear opportunity for substantial improvements in Figure 73
workforce participation in the future comes in the 50-64 year old age

Fewer Mainers have participated

group. Only about two members of this group in three are em historically in the workforce than
ployed, including three-quarters of the men and 57 percent of the is typical of the New England

region but Maine appears to have

women. More than one in five women in this group describes narrowed the gap since 1985
herself as a full time homemaker, the largest proportion of any age
group. Nearly twenty percent of the men and 16 percent of the
women between 50 and 64 have taken early retirement, shares that
are most likely to be concentrated at the upper end of the group or
between the ages of 58 and 64.

While some increase in the

participation rate is possible, this age group is presently dominated
by the Depression era generation and, from the mid-1990s to the
middle of the following decade, will be dominated by the Second
World W ar generation — the two generations together making up
the smallest birth groups in modern history. Even with increased
participation rates, therefore, the numbers of additional workers to
be drawn from this group will be small.
Older teenagers between 15 and 17 years of age also
contribute to the overall size of the labor force, most often by
accepting part time work after school or during vacations. To the
extent that the members of this group are available for full time
work, their contribution to the labor force is more than offset by the
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Source: U.S. Census; Maine Dept, of
Labor; Northeast Research, Inc.

negative social impact of their having dropped out of school. While
the Commission developed no new information on the participation
rate of 15 to 17 year olds — just under half worked in 1985 — the
overall size of this group will reach a long term low in 1990 and will
climb only slowly through the following 15 years to the numbers
that existed in the mid-1980s.

The Components of
Maine's Workforce
Percent Participating in 1988
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Whether the lessening in the historical slack in Maine’s
labor supply will result in labor shortages or constraints on eco
nomic growth in the future will depend as well on the levels of

Figure 74
Most age groups in Maine appear
to be working at or near their
maximum levels, except for the
50 to 64 year old age group in
which early retirements have
pulled people out of the
workforce. Limits on future
growth in the Maine labor force
may become apparent in the
1990s.

demand for labor that emerge in the coming twenty years. A key
trend determining labor demand will be the future performance of
M aine’s economy.
Maine in the 1980s has reached a new level of economic
prosperity, unmatched since the middle of the 19th Century. While
this prosperity is certainly influenced by the presence of fortuitous
circumstances like the hot real estate markets of the mid 1980s, its
foundation appears to be a fundamental restructuring of the state’s

Source: Northeast Research, Inc.

manufacturing sector.
The role of manufacturing in generating just under onethird of all economic activity in Maine is almost unchanged since
1969, but the kinds of products Maine produces are undergoing a
historic shift. By the early 1990s, most of the state’s manufacturing
jobs will be in the durable goods industries — electronic equipment
and fabricated metal products, for exam ple— and a shrinking share
will be in the traditional nondurables sector that created Maine’s
past reputation as shoemaker, weaver and papermaker to the nation.
As the 1980s began, only two manufacturing jobs in five
were in the durables sector; by the end of the decade, the ratio had
become nearly one in two. At the end of the century, the transfor80

mation of Maine’s manufacturing economy will have come nearly
full circle, with the durables sector contributing nearly three manu
facturing jobs in five — an almost complete reversal of the situation
in 1980.
Maine’s economy has also become more diversified in the
past twenty years as the mill town syndrome of single large

Maine's Gross
State Product
Billions of 1977 Dollars

employers has been replaced by a growing mix of light industry, of
business services tapping a regional market, and of consumer
services that have expanded to meet the demand created under the
new regime of prosperity.
Since 1982, Maine has maintained a lower unemployment
rate than the nation for the first time in a generation. During the
same period, personal income has increased faster in Maine than in
the nation for the first time in fifty years. More than 100,000 new

Figure 75

jobs were created in Maine between 1980 and 1988, a 35 percent The restructured Maine economy
of the 1980s is projected to
continue on a moderate growth
path through the turn of the
century, generating new jobs
Maine in the 1980s has joined the New England region in the faster than the internal population
difficult process of industrial restructuring in the face of new global is adding people.

annual increase over the previous decade.

competition in manufacturing and the emerging dominance of the Source. Maine simulation and Fore
service sector in the domestic economy. During the 1970s, this casting Model
regional process translated into the nation’s highest rates of unem
ployment and worker dislocation as wave after wave of shoe, textile
and durable goods manufacturers succumbed to the pressures of
high unit costs for energy and intense market competition from
lower cost imported products.
Yet by 198 3, following the devastating impact of two severe
recessions, most of New England’s marginal production capacity
had been eliminated, leaving the surviving economy among the
nation’s best prepared for the period of sustained growth that has
characterized the remainder of the decade. This paradoxical process
— what the economist Joseph Schumpeter called the “creative
destruction” at the heart of the capitalist system — is now taking
place throughout the American economy as obsolete producers go
under and free up the resources they controlled for new uses.
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The New England economies — perhaps the hardest hit in
the 1970s — were the first to emerge from the 1982 recession. The
strong performance that has followed reflects the region’s lead
position.

By 1985-86, the generalized regional prosperity had

reached Maine from southern New England, generating a surge in
job creation in the state that is pushing M aine’s share of all private

Labor Force
Dynamics in Maine

nonfarm jobs in the U.S. from a range around 0.48 percent that

Inmigration Scenario

characterized the 1970-1985 period to a range around 0.52 percent
at the end of the 1980s. In terms of the internal strength of the Maine
economy and its competitive position relative to the rest of the
nation, the potential exists for this stronger employment share to be
preserved for the next twenty years. While this gain on the nation
of roughly one twentieth of one percent appears small in percentage
S I Civilian
Jobs

E2 Prime
Pool

H

Labor
Force

terms, it represents in actuality the creation of nearly a quarter of a
million jobs in Maine in the past 15 years, with the sharpest gains
experienced since 1985. The tight labor markets of the late 1980s

Figure 76
Labor markets are likely to be
tight in Maine In the 1990s but
improvements in participation
rates and productivity could be
sufficient to preserve the market
balance.

are directly related to this substantial and accelerating level of job
creation.
Yet this very front-running status invites new domestic
competition from imitators in the private sector and from economic
developers in the public sector who face a shorter and less costly

Source: Maine Simulation and Fore
casting Model

learning curve that benefits from the New England experience. As
other regions of the country begin to reproduce the New England
performance of the 1980s, Maine’s and the region’s share of all U.S.
jobs may return to more long term historical levels.
M aine’s job creation potential — particularly through the
1990s— may well exceed the potential for growth in the labor force,
except under the optimistic assumption that inmigration will in
crease from present levels by about 40 percent. The potential
shortfall o f labor is particularly acute among M aine’s youngest
workers, those 18 to 24 who typically fill newly created jobs at the
entry level. This age group is projected to experience an absolute
decline through 2010 of 19,000 persons, a drop o f nearly 14 percent.
This loss, occurring in a strategic component of the labor force, can
be expected to exacerbate whatever tight conditions do emerge in
the labor market through the coming years.
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M aine’s economy has the potential to double over 1985
levels by the year 2010, as measured either by the real dollar value
of output or by the broader measure of real Gross Regional Product.
Employment gains associated with this level of growth could be on
the order of nearly a quarter-million jobs through the same period
— an increase of nearly 40 percent. Growth in the labor force,
however, through the same period is likely to be closer to 20 percent.
The key to continued economic growth without continued job
growth will be the rate of technology adoption and productivity
improvement achieved by Maine employers. M aine’s manufactur
ing sector has improved productivity on a par with the rest of the
nation during the 1980s.

During the 1990s, the challenge of

improving productivity will confront the service sector, which has
absorbed successive waves of women, baby boomers and dislocated
industrial workers but has not yet faced a serious economic chal
lenge from global competition or from human resource limits.
The increasing role of technology in the workplace repre
sents the uncertainty factor in the future demand for labor in Maine.
Technology typically moderates the demand for labor as machines
are substituted for human employees. This effect is visible in the
recent performance of a number of M aine’s manufacturing indus
tries, but is nowhere more visible than in the performance of the
paper industry in which the trends in investment, employment and
output are clear to even casual observation. Industry modernization
has absorbed more than a billion dollars in new investment in the
1980s and about $3.5-billion since World War II. Through more
than four decades, the number of jobs in the paper industry has rarely
varied from a range of 17,000 to 18,000, while output has increased
steadily since 1970 at a rate of about three percent per year. In the
coming twenty years, the industry is projected to achieve similar
production gains with even fewer workers and paper industry
employment is projected to drop by nearly 4,000jobs through 2010.
The difficulty with projecting an overall decline in employ
ment as jobs are automated, however, stems from two countervail
ing effects that may also follow technology investment. In a study
of the employment effects of technology investment on a regional

economy, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City found that the direct job losses arising from auto
mation in some industries tend to be offset by job growth in other industries. The net effect, therefore,
may be neutral in terms of overall employment, although the industries experiencing job creation may
be located at a distance from those experiencing losses, may require different skills than those possessed
by the workers displaced by automation, or may pay substantially lower wages than did the jobs that were
lost. A more positive result was identified in a Japanese Labor Ministry study, which found that onehalf of the firms that automated production ended by adding new jobs to keep up with increased orders
and expanding market shares.
Whether the demand for labor increases or decreases in response to future investments in
technology in Maine, then, would appear to depend on how well Maine firms compete in the global
economy of the future. Investment in technology allows productivity to improve and can enhance a
firm’s competitive position. The result may be a loss in jobs if the firm ’s management uses its improved
position simply to hold on to its existing markets, or job gains if management responds aggressively to
the new opportunity. Failure to invest in new technology, however, would appear to guarantee both job
and business losses as firms lose their ability to compete in a changing marketplace.
Technology may hold an additional benefit on the supply side of the labor market as well by
expanding the pool of potentially productive workers to include those with limited skills, with physical
handicaps and those who may be home-bound through family responsibilities or lack of mobility. While
the expansion of home work opportunities has been most evident for high-level knowledge workers
capable of “telecommuting” via computer linkages with markets anywhere in the world, the expansion
of production-based cottage industries and piece work opportunities has also been evident in Maine in
the 1980s. With the exception of the expanding use of TTY systems to provide telecommunications
access to the hearing impaired, the adoption of specialized technology that expands the opportunities for
Maine’s 68,000 handicapped population has not been particularly evident in the state. Nevertheless, sub
stantial gains are being made nationally in the field of enabling technologies, which will certainly begin
to impact Maine as these products move from the innovation stage into broader markets.
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CONCLUSION

THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE

The demographic, economic and attitudinal trends identified in this paper do not determine the
shape of Maine’s future but they do contribute strongly to the direction of change. They can be altered
or overcome but only with conscious effort and considerable difficulty. For trends that are long
established, the effort required for change will often be extreme and will be made at substantial risk of
failure. For trends that are now emerging, action taken quickly will require the least cost and offer the
greatest chance of success. Thus, effective action in shaping the future o f Maine will require the careful
concentration of effort, resources and political will on the limited number of options that offer the greatest
opportunity or hold the greatest threat and that provide the greatest reasonable chance of success.
Four trends appear to be compelling, both as the inevitable results of changes now taking place
and as the driving forces for additional change in the future.
o

Slower growth was built into Maine’s future nearly thirty years
ago when fertility rates began to decline after the great surge in
birth rates that followed World War II. The slowdown will
give the state the opportunity to adjust to the rapid changes of
the past two decades and to plan for the physical direction of
future development and for the preservation of the state’s resources.
But inmigration will become increasingly important to the state’s
future growth, its character and its vitality. Maine will become
more dependent on an imported labor force and will have to compete
with other states to attract young workers. And in time the non-native
share of the population may climb from 30 to 40 percent.

o

An aging population will stabilize society and strengthen its basic
institutions. Leisure time and spending will climb; prosperity will
increase at the household level. Medical expenses will climb toward
a coming explosion of demand pressure and costs; medical technology
and scientific advance are likely to be stimulated into a period of rapid
achievement. Health insurance and pension access will continue to
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rise on the public agenda. Labor markets will tighten but school
populations will stabilize, bringing comprehensive education reform
within financial and logistic reach. But school constituencies will
decline and budget fights become tougher. Recreational, cultural and
educational opportunities for children will become scarcer at the
community level, and with them, children’s quality of life.
o

Metropolitanization will change southern Maine, as the
region absorbs most of what growth is still to come. A critical mass
of population and economic activity will trigger self-sustaining urban
development, but will also bring crowding, congestion, fractured
communities, recreational resource losses and a regional inmigrant
majority. Extensive suburbanization will keep pressure on the region’s
villages and towns fostering rising infrastructure costs and property
taxes. Urban employment centers and suburban growth centers will
forge regional revenue solutions as their common interest emerges.
Steady growth will flow up the 1-95 Corridor as southern prosperity
expands to the north but urbanization will be localized. Commuting
and traffic will continue to grow but, without an early consensus
to boost highway spending, congestion will increase.
Rural preservation will gain political support, but land posting will
become increasingly common.

o

The dominance of the baby boom and the inmigrant population
will push income and educational levels higher and will raise the level
of trust in government. Resistance to growth and change will erode, but
sharp divisions will emerge over access, development, urbanization and
land use controls. Policy will be directed toward a real balance between
the economy and the environment; tradeoffs will be rejected in the search
for “sustainable growth.” Constraints on bureaucratic expansion will
ease but government activism will remain a source of political difference;
broad rhetoric will be tested against effectiveness and accountability.
Elderly entitlements will be expanded; schools will gain status; women
will fully participate in public and economic life.

In addition to these major trends, others lie parallel to or flow from them. A period of relative
calm is coming to Maine, arising in the combination of social stability in the aging population and of
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prosperity in the continued strength of the restructured state and regional economies; in the more
balanced development of slower growth and in the more balanced distribution of opportunity in tight
labor markets.
Coincidental with the period of calm and prosperity, aresurgence of the classic suburban lifestyle
— home and family centered— is emerging among inmigrants and young adults. These accoutrements
of the Fifties, however, will not bring the return of the full-time homemaker as well. Beyond the two
incomes that will be needed to sustain a neosuburban lifestyle, the young mothers of the Nineties will
expect the same career achievements as do their husbands, and in the tight labor markets o f the future
they will get them. Western Maine and The County are off the growth path for this suburban lifestyle;
southern Maine, the 1-95 Corridor and the coast east o f Bath are likely to absorb what will come.
Despite the general slowdown in population growth, housing growth will only slow by about half
as much. Real estate markets will accordingly experience a correction in the early 1990s, ratcheting
down to a more moderate pace of price and volume growth, but the land and housing booms of the 1980s
are not yet over. Yet Mainers of all ages and inmigrants as well remain ambivalent about growth
management and seem to view existing legislation as an experiment. There is a growing constituency
for rural preservation, but a suspicion that growth management could hold prosperity hostage. If
continued development at a slower pace allows towns to meet these two objectives, the “experiment”
may be judged a success.
Increasing numbers of the very old — the population over age 80 will double — and the tripling
of total household spending on health care — in part from rising costs and in part from the aging of
householders — will keep the medical and geriatric care systems near the top of the political agenda. But
this attention and the increased flow of private as well as public money into those systems will help the
entire society prepare for the final stage of the baby boom as it grows into advanced age three decades
into the coming century. Even though the emerging population over age 80 will be small in comparison
to that long term future event, its doubling will strain the existing system and force investment now and
reveal lessons for the future. Similarly, the demand on retirees by labor-hungry employers may, by
pioneering the extension of the normal working life, ease the rollback of the retirement age to 70 before
the flood of baby boomers begins to draw down pension and Social Security funds.
But neither the elderly, nor the mothers of young children, will ease the coming pressure on labor
markets in the 1990s. Employers will turn increasingly to productivity enhancement to moderate their
need for labor, stimulating technology investment and turning public attention and funding to technology
assessment and transfer programs to speed the pace of adoption in a state unused to capital-intensive
production. The service sector, its rapid growth to dominance force fed on seemingly unlimited labor
supplies, will face the challenge of productivity improvement and constraints on labor supplies. For
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workers, the future holds higher wages and the democratization of jobs and skills, with higher levels of
educational attainment the price of admission.
At home, those higher wages will be absorbed by already high-priced houses, high-priced cars
and high-priced fuel. For the young, health insurance premiums will continue higher; for the old, direct
care will cost more. In an increasingly “uplinked” society, telecommunications costs will rise as well.
For the poor, for the elderly and for single parents, who spend the largest shares of their budgets on the
necessities of life, the rising costs of traditional and emerging necessities promises new trials. The single
elderly are often linked to the world by telephone and risk increasing isolation as their costs of
communication rise. The elderly in general and single parents tend to balance their budgets by limiting
transportation in quantity or quality and risk increasing loss of mobility when their incomes fall behind
the pace of economic expansion. But other necessities — food and clothing — will become cheaper in
the future generating needed slack in the budgets of the poor and freeing discretionary income in the
budgets of the more prosperous.
That new discretionary income will be spent most often on recreation and entertainment, often
at home but increasingly in travel. But the emerging travel mode will be concentrated — shorter, more
frequent, more intense. Annual vacations are giving way to long seasonal weekends and spending is on
the rise. Recreational spending by Maine households will triple through the coming decades, and much
of that spending will be committed in their home state. A similar increase will be experienced in the
higher income households of neighboring states, but much of that spending will will be brought to Maine.
The labor shortages already evident in this service industry will remain a concern but increasing
prosperity in the tourism industry may push low wage levels higher to stabilize labor supplies. But the
increasing pressure on M aine’s roads and resources will keep recreational development high on the
public agenda.

The Emerging Opportunity

The demographic picture that emerges for the future of Maine is one of a ten to fifteen year period
of relative stability in Maine society when compared to the rapid growth period the preceded it and to
the period of intensive demands on institutions, programs and services that will follow. This period is
likely to begin sometime in the mid 1990s and will close around again the year 2010 when the baby boom
begins to reach retirement age.
88

This period of demographic calm is likely to be marked (1) by greater stability in households,
reflected in slower job and housing turnover and by higher (relative) incomes and assets, (2) by greater
stability in society, reflected in lower rates of criminal activity, highway accidents and substance abuse,
and (3) by greater availability of leisure time. The economy is likely to benefit from the greater
productivity of more experienced workers; civic life is likely to benefit from higher levels of citizen
participation.
The period is also likely to be marked by greater balance in overall growth and a broader
distribution of economic prosperity. A number of trends come together to support these expectations.

o

A basic trend is the greater diversification of the Maine economy, which
produces a much wider range of goods and services today than it did in the
past. This means the economy is better able to withstand recessions and is
more resilient in the face of catastrophic changes in individual industrial
sectors. The Maine economy is also adding value more rapidly and
efficiently than it did in the past, bringing a larger share of the national pool
of wealth into the state. Finally, the location as well as the content of
Maine’s economy is becoming more diversified as well. The prosperity that
has marked the southern Maine economy since the early 1980s has begun to
spread up the 1-95 Corridor to Lewiston-Auburn, Augusta-Waterville and
Bangor in the late Eighties as businesses are formed or relocate near the
land and labor pools more readily available in these cities.

o

A second basic trend is the contraction in the population of the state between
the ages of 18 and 34 — the age group which provides entry level labor for
the jobs created by a prosperous economy. This group will decline by
50,000 persons between 1986 and 2010, leading employers to turn
increasingly to populations who have been neglected in the past and whom
prosperity has consequently passed by.

o

The same group — those 18 to 34 — also form the core market for housing
development and the decline in their numbers will amplify the effects of an
overall slowdown in population growth in easing the pressure on land use,
housing markets and public infrastructures that has so severely unbalanced
life in Maine during the 1980s. It is difficult to say whether housing will
become more affordable; it is likely that housing will become more available
and that development will proceed in the future in a more orderly fashion.
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In contrast with this period of calm — of social and household stability, relative (and perhaps
absolute) prosperity and the greater balance of steady, moderate growth— the pressure of the young baby
boom in the previous era forced disruptive public investment in schools, roads, prisons, police,
recreation, welfare, housing, waste disposal and other infrastructure at a rapid and reactive pace.
Similarly, the pressure of the elderly baby boom in the subsequent era will trigger a new round of
investment in pension fund bailouts, health care facilities, elderly housing, nursing homes and public
transit systems at a pace that will be more predictable but no less rapid.
The opportunity offered by this demographic window, therefore, is both temporary and critical
to the state’s ability to plan for the long term and to invest strategically in the human and capital resources
that will allow us to get out in front of events and to stay there. This demographic stability is particularly
crucial because it coincides with a period of economic and technological transition as fundamental as the
adoption of steam power, railroads, electrification and the automobile. The challenge posed by this
transition — to a global economy driven by computerized tools and information at the instantaneous
speed of telecommunications — will bring sufficient turmoil even to a society that is not overrun by
runaway development or burgeoning human needs.
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The Commission on Maine’s Future was established by the Maine Legislature in 1987
to “recommend a desirable and feasible description of the state’s future,” under bipartisian
legislation originated by Senate President Charles P. Pray and cosponsored by Speaker of the
House John L. Martin, Sen. Thomas R. Perkins and Rep. Donnell Carroll. Forty members
were appoi n ted by the Governor, President of the Senate and S peaker of the House to represent
diverse viewpoints, backgrounds and regions of the state. The Commission’s publications
program is one part of a coordinated response to our legislative mandate. Reports in the series
explore various aspects of Maine and its future and are intended to provide useful information,
to provoke discussion and disseminate the Commission’s findings as broadly as possible to
the people of Maine.
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DATA TABLES

TABLE 1
T H E M A IN E P O P U L A T IO N

T hree G row th Scenarios
History and Projections
1950-2010

Census
Scenario

Inm igration
Scenario

Prosperity
Scenario

TO TA L PO PULA TIO N
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

914,000
969,000
1,034,000
1,125,000
1,213,000
1,271,000
1,308,000

914,000
969,000
1,034,000
1,125,000
1,213,000
1,290,000
1,346,000

914,000
969,000
1,034,000
1,125,000
1,219,000
1,310,000
1,369,000

PO PULA TIO N CHANGE
1950- 1960
1960- 1970
1970 - 1980
1980- 1990
1990 - 2000
2000 - 2010

55,000
65,000
91,000
88,000
58,000
37,000

55,000
65,000
91,000
88,000
77,000
56,000

55,000
65,000
91,000
94,000
91,000
59,000

G RO W TH RATE
1950 - 1960
1960- 1970
1970- 1980
1980- 1990
1990 - 2000
2000 - 2010

6.02%
6.71%
8.80%
7.82%
4.78%
2.91%

6.02%
6.71%
8.80%
7.82%
6.35%
4.34%

6.02%
6.71%
8.80%
8.36%
7.47%
4.50%

TABLE 2
GROWTH AND MIGRATION

History and Projections
1960 - 2010

Census Scenario
Declining Inmigration

Natural Increase
Net Migration
Net Change

1960-70

1970-80

1980-90

1990-00

2000-10

93,000
-28,000
65,000

56,000
35,000
91,000

51,000
37,000
88,000

41,000
16,000
57,000

20,000
17,000
37,000

Inmigration Scenario
Constant Inmigration

Natural Increase
Net Migration
Net Change

1960-70

1970-80

1980-90

1990-00

2000-10

93,000
-28,000
65,000

56,000
35,000
91,000

51,000
37,000
88,000

41,000
36,000
77,000

20,000
36,000
56,000

Prosperity Scenario
Increasing Inmigration

Natural Increase
Net Migration
Net Change

1960-70

1970-80

1980-90

1990-00

2000-10

93,000
-28,000
65,000

56,000
35,000
91,000

51,000
43,000
94,000

41,000
50,000
91,000

20,000
39,000
59,000

TABLE 3
T H E M A IN E P O P U L A T IO N B Y H O U S E H O L D

History and Projections
1960 - 2010

Census Scenario

1960
1980
1990
2000

2010

Total
Population

Population
in Households

969,000
1,125,000
1,213,000
1,271,000
1,308,000

936,000
1,088,000
1,173,000
1,229,000
1,265,000

Total
Households

Persons
per Household

280,000
395,000
461,000
519,000
561,000

3.34
2.75
2.55
2.37
2.26

Total
Households

Persons
per Household

Inmigration Scenario

1960
1980
1990
2000
2010

Total
Population

Population
in Households

969,000
1,125,000
1,213,000
1,290,000
1,346,000

936,000
1,088,000
1,173,000
1,247,000
1,302,000

280,000
395,000
461,000
527,000
577,000

3.34
2.75
2.55
2.37
2.26

Total
Households

Persons
per Household

Prosperity Scenario

1960
1980
1990
2000
2010

Total
Population

Population
in Households

969,000
1,125,000
1,219,000
1,310,000
1,369,000

936,000
1,088,000
1,179,000
1,267,000
1,324,000

280,000
395,000
463,000
535,000
587,000

3.34
2.75
2.55
2.37
2.26

TABLE 4

HOUSEHOLDS AND HOUSING
History and Projections
1960 - 2010

Census Scenario

1960
1980
1985
1986
1987
1990
2000
2010

Housing
Units

Total
Households

Units per
Household

304,000
427,000
457,000
467,000
477,000
499,000
562,000
607,000

280,000
395,000
431,000
434,000
441,000
461,000
519,000
561,000

1.0857
1.0821
1.0603
1.0765
1.0822
1.0822
1.0829
1.0829

Inmigration Scenario

1960
1980
1985
1986
1987
1990
2000
2010

Housing
Units

Total
Households

Units per
Household

304,000
427,000
457,000
467,000
477,000
499,000
571,000
625,000

280,000
395,000
431,000
434,000
441,000
461,000
527,000
577,000

1.0857
1.0821
1.0603
1.0765
1.0822
1.0822
1.0829
1.0829

Prosperity Scenario

1960
1980
1985
1986
1987
1990
2000
2010

Housing
Units

Total
Households

Units per
Household

304,000
427,000
457,000
467,000
477,000
501,000
579,000
636,000

280,000
395,000
431,000
434,000
441,000
463,000
535,000
587,000

1.0857
1.0821
1.0603
1.0765
1.0822
1.0822
1.0829
1.0829

Table 5A

COUNTY POPULATIONS
1980 with Projections to 2010

CENSUS SCEN A R IO

Southern
York
Cumberland
Sagadahoc

Central
Kennebec
Somerset
Lincoln
Knox

Eastern
Penobscot
Piscataquis
Waldo
Hancock
Washington

Western
Androscoggin
Oxford
Franklin

Northern
Aroostook

1980

1990

2000

2010

385000

433000

458000

473000

140000
216000
29000

170000
232000
31000

183000
243000
32000

193000
247000
33000

214000

234000

251000

264000

110000
45000
26000
33000

115000
49000
33000
37000

121000
52000
37000
41000

123000
55000
42000
44000

260000

275000

289000

300000

137000
18000
28000
42000
35000

142000
19000
31000
48000
35000

145000
20000
34000
55000
35000

147000
22000
36000
61000
34000

176000

185000

193000

197000

100000
49000
27000

103000
52000
30000

105000
54000
34000

106000
56000
35000

91000

86000

81000

75000

91000

86000

81000

75000

Table 5B

COUNTY POPULATIONS
1980 with Projections to 2010

INMIGRATION SCENARIO

Southern
York
Cumberland
Sagadahoc

Central
Kennebec
Somerset
Lincoln
Knox

Eastern
Penobscot
Piscataquis
Waldo
Hancock
Washington

Western
Androscoggin
Oxford
Franklin

Northern
Aroostook

1980

1990

2000

2010

385000

433000

460900

482000

140000
216000
29000

170000
232000
31000

184500
244100
32300

199400
249000
33600

214000

234000

252500

266600

110000
45000
26000
33000

115000
49000
33000
37000

121000
52300
37700
41500

123000
55500
43200
44900

260000

275000

290100

303800

137000
18000
28000
42000
35000

142000
19000
31000
48000
35000

145400
20300
34500
55900
34000

147800
22500
36900
62600
34000

176000

185000

193300

197500

100000
49000
27000

103000
52000
30000

105000
54100
34200

106000
56200
35300

91000

86000

81000

75000

91000

86000

81000

75000

Table 5C

COUNTY POPULATIONS
1980 with Projections to 2010

PROSPERITY SCENARIO

Southern
York
Cumberland
Sagadahoc

Central
Kennebec
Somerset
Lincoln
Knox

Eastern
Penobscot
Piscataquis
Waldo
Hancock
Washington

Western
Androscoggin
Oxford
Franklin

Northern
Aroostook

1980

1990

2000

2010

385000

436500

473200

485800

140000
216000
29000

172500
232800
31200

196100
243800
33300

202000
249900
33900

214000

235100

256500

267800

110000
45000
26000
33000

115000
49200
33500
37400

121000
53000
39600
42900

123000
55700
43800
45300

260000

276500

296700

305300

137000
18000
28000
42000
35000

142300
19200
31400
48600
35000

146600
21000
35900
58200
35000

148100
22700
37300
63200
34000

176000

185200

193900

197600

100000
49000
27000

103000
52100
30100

105000
54300
34600

106000
56200
35400

91000

86000

81000

75000

91000

86000

81000

75000

TABLE 6A
H O U S IN G G R O W T H

Total Additions by County
1980 to 2010
Census Scenario

Statewide
Southern
York
Cumberland
Sagadahoc
Central
Kennebec
Somerset
Lincoln
Knox
Eastern
Penobscot
Piscataquis
Waldo
Hancock
Washington
Western
Androscoggin
Oxford
Franklin
Northern
Aroostook

History
1980- 1987

Projection
1988 -2010

Total
1980 - 2010

49,313

130,013

179,326

24,122

63,596

87,718

11,325
10,973
1,824

29,861
28,925
4,810

41,186
39,898
6,634

7,830

20,644

28,474

3,868
1,024
1,472
1,466

10,192
2,704
3,887
3,861

14,060
3,728
5,359
5,327

9,795

25,818

35,613

5,631
421
1,116
2,020
607

14,846
1,105
2,938
5,330
1,599

20,477
1,526
4,054
7,350
2,206

5,929

15,639

21,568

3,032
1,906
991

7,995
5,031
2,613

11,027
6,937
3,604

1,637

4,316

5,953

1,637

4,316

5,953

N o te : I n c lu d e s n e w u n its o n ly ;
I n c lu d e s s in g le , m u lti-fa m ily , m a n u fa c tu r e d , s e a s o n a l a n d u n o c c u p ie d u n its

TABLE 6B
A N N U A L H O U S IN G G R O W T H

Annual Additions by County
1980 to 2010
Census Scenario

Statewide
Southern
York
Cumberland
Sagadahoc

Annual Rate
1980 - 1987

Annual Rate
1988 - 2010

7,045

5,653

3,446

2,765

1,618
1,568
261

1,298
1,258
209

1,119

Central
Kennebec
Somerset
Lincoln
Knox

553
146
210
209
1,399

Eastern
Penobscot
Piscataquis
Waldo
Hancock
Washington
Western
Androscoggin
Oxford
Franklin
Northern
Aroostook

898
443
118
169
168
1,123

804
60
159
289
87

645
48
128
232
70

847

681

433
272
142

348
219
114

234

188

234

188

N o te : I n c lu d e s n e w u n its o n ly ;
I n c lu d e s sin g le , m u lti-fa m ily , m a n u fa c tu r e d , s e a s o n a l a n d u n o c c u p ie d u n its

TABLE 7

THE MAINE POPULATION
1986 and 2000

Census Scenario

Age
Cohort

1986
Population

1986-2010
Change

2010
Population

85 & +
80-84
75-79

17,000
20,000
30,000

15,000
5,000
2,000

32,000
25,000
32,000

70-7 4
65 - 69
60-64
55-59

40,000
49,000
53,000
56,000

0
7,000
25,000
36,000

40,000
56,000
78,000
92,000

50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39

53,000
56,000
69,000
93,000

50,000
51,000
25,000
-10,000

103,000
107,000
94,000
83,000

30-34
25-29
20-24
18 - 19

96,000
100,000
100,000
38,000

-16,000
-18,000
-16,000
-3,000

80,000
82,000
84,000
35,000

56,000
82,000
81,000
82,000

-2,000
1,000
-5,000
-9,000

54,000
83,000
76,000
73,000

1,171,000

138,000

1,308,000

15 1050-

17
14
9
4

Total

Note: Cohort populations do not sum to projected total due to rounding

TABLE 8
TH E M AINE PO PU LA TIO N

Projected Change
1986 - 2010
Census Scenario

Age
Cohort

1986 - 1990
Change

1990 - 1995
Change

1995 - 2000
Change

2000 - 2005
Change

2005 - 2010
Change

85 & +
80-84
75-79

3,000
1,000
2,000

3,000
2,000
2,000

3,000
1,000
1,000

3,000
2,000
-1,000

3,000
-1,000
-2,000

70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59

2,000
1,000
0
-4,000

1,000
-1,000
-4,000
1,000

-1,000
-4,000
1,000
11,000

-3,000
1,000
10,000
19,000

1,000
10,000
18,000
9,000

50-54
45 r 49
40-44
35-39

2,000
11,000
19,000
4,000

11,000
20,000
9,000
8,000

20,000
9,000
8,000
4,000

9,000
8,000
4,000
-15,000

8,000
3,000
-15,000
-11,000

30-34
25-29
20-24
18 - 19

7,000
4,000
-12,000
-2,000

5,000
-15,000
-11,000
-5,000

-15,000
-11,000
-2,000
3,000

-11,000
-2,000
6,000
1,000

-2,000
6,000
3,000
0

15- 17
10-14
5- 9
0- 4

-9,000
1,000
5,000
5,000

2,000
6,000
4,000
-3,000

3,000
4,000
-3,000
-4,000

3,000
-4,000
-7,000
-4,000

-3,000
-6,000
-4,000
1,000

Total Change 42,000

35,000

24,000

19,000

18,000

TABLE 9A

MAINE HOUSEHOLDS
Population
History and Projections
1980 and 2005

Household
Type

Single
15-34
35-64

Elderly
Single
Couples
Couples
No Children
Preschoolers
K -12 Children
Children >17
Single Parent

1980
Number of
Households

2005
Number of
Households

45,226
19,465
25,761

60,430
18,880
41,550

87,121
48,648
38,473

121,400
67.950
53,450

214,572
66,293
56,743
74,155
17,381

285,610
93,760
60,750
103,150
27.950

43,878

53,550

TABLE 9B

MAINE HOUSEHOLDS
Structure
History and Projections
1980 and 2005

Household
Type

1980
Percent
of all
Households

2005
Percent
of all
Households

11.6%
5.0%
6.6%

11.3%
3.5%
7.8%

Elderly
Single
Couples

22.3%
12.5%
9.9%

22.8%
12.7%
10.0%

Couples
No Children
Preschoolers
K -12 Children
Children >17

54.9%
17.0%
14.5%
19.0%
4.5%

53.6%
17.6%
11.4%
19.3%
5.2%

Single Parent

11.2%

10.0%

Single
15-34
35-64

TABLE 9C
M A IN E H O U S E H O L D S

Income
History and Projections
1980 and 2005

Household
Type

1980
Average
Disposable
Income

2005
Average
Disposable
Income

9,702
9,476
9,872

16,924
16,450
17,140

Elderly
Single
Couples

10,382
8,500
12,762

18,018
14,760
22,160

Couples
No Children
Preschoolers
K -12 Children
Children >17

20,347
22,275
17,334
20,517
22,099

35,718
38,675
30,100
35,620
38,370

Single Parent

11,541

20,040

Single
15-34
35-64

